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This dissertation investigates two questions about capital flow management:
first, how to manage capital flows when there is more than one market imperfection;
second, whether capital flow restrictions lead to multilateral spillover effects.
In Chapter 2, I study the first question in a small open-economy DSGE model
with two frictions: downward nominal wage rigidity and a price-dependent borrow-
ing constraint. Wage rigidity introduces an aggregate demand externality under
fixed exchange rates and the borrowing constraint introduces a pecuniary external-
ity. I provide an analytical characterization of optimal capital flow management
measures and show how they mitigate the externalities. Specifically, I find that the
optimal policy in this economy is to restricts capital inflows when the risk of financial
crisis is high or when wage is increasing, and to restrict capital outflows when unem-
ployment is high and the risk of financial crisis is low. Using quantitative methods
and standard calibration, I show that the optimal state-contingent capital inflow
tax and even a non-state-contingent flat tax can significantly reduce unemployment
and prevent financial crises, hence ultimately improving welfare. These results are
of particular relevance for members of a currency union or emerging economies with
an exchange rate peg.
I consider the second question in Chapter 3. In a simple model of capital
flows and controls, I show that inflow restrictions distort international capital flows
to other countries and that, in turn, such capital flow deflection may lead to a
policy response. I then test the theory using data on inflow restrictions and gross
capital inflows for a large sample of developing countries between 1995 and 2009.
My estimation yields strong evidence that capital controls deflect capital flows to
other countries with similar risk levels. Notwithstanding these strong cross-border
spillover effects, I do not find evidence of a policy response.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Over the last two decades, cross-border capital flows have experienced an ex-
traordinary increase in both volume and volatility (see Figure 1.1). Although large
capital inflows are good news for the countries that are in need of investment, they
carry significant economic and financial risks. On the one hand, large capital inflows
could accelerate the formation of asset bubbles and exacerbate economic overheat-
ing. On the other hand, capital inflows could suddenly stop or even reverse when
international investors decide to look elsewhere, which could lead to severe finan-
cial crises, known as episodes of sudden stops. For instance, some economists argue
that the large capital inflows during the 2003-2007 pre-crisis period was a major
contributory factor to the subsequent crisis in the euro area (see e.g. Lane, 2013).
As a result, capital flow management (also known as capital controls), once
seen as the enemy of free trade and open market, is now becoming increasingly
popular among policy makers. For example, Brazil introduced a tax on foreign
capital inflows (IOF tax) in 2009, and it made active adjustments to the policy
throughout the financial crisis (see Table 1.1).1 The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) has also recently endorsed capital flow management as a part of the toolkit
1The IOF tax was created to replace the CPMF tax, abolished in 2008.
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for safeguarding macroeconomic and financial stability (IMF, 2012). This change
in perspective among policy makers is not only a response to the reality of the
increasingly volatile capital flows across the world, but it is also a reflection of
recent advances in academic research.
As Jeanne (2012) points out, the theoretical literature had little to say about
capital flow management until recently. Much of the previous research had focused
on establishing the empirical connection between capital account liberalization and
economic performance.2 Though the empirical findings were mixed, most were in
favor of capital account liberalization (see e.g. Kose et al., 2009, for a survey on
2See e.g. Edwards (2001), Eichengreen (2001), Prasad et al. (2003), and Bekaert et al. (2005).
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Table 1.1: Brazil Capital Controls: IOF Tax Since 2009
Date Capital Controls
19-Oct-09 2% IOF entry tax on portfolio inflows (equities & fixed income)
4-Oct-10 4% IOF entry tax on fixed income inflows
18-Oct-10 6% IOF entry tax on fixed income inflows
29-Mar-11 6% IOF entry tax on foreign loans with maturity below 1 year
6-Apr-11 6% IOF entry tax on foreign loans with maturity below 2 years
29-Feb-12 6% IOF entry tax on foreign loans with maturity below 3 years
9-Mar-12 6% IOF entry tax on foreign loans with maturity below 5 years
14-Jun-12 Tax on foreign loans with maturity above 2 years drops to 0%.
05-Jun-13 Tax on foreign loans with maturity above 1 year drops to 0%.
05-Jun-14 Tax on foreign loans with maturity above 180 days drops to 0%.
Source: Financial Times, Haver
the vast literature).3 However, more recently, a growing welfare-based analysis has
provided policy makers the theoretical justification for employing capital flow man-
agement. Specifically, Korinek (2010) shows that capital flow management could
improve welfare when financial market is imperfect; Schmitt-Groé and Uribe (2013a)
show that capital flow management could reduce unemployment when real wage is
downwardly rigid; Farhi and Werning (2013b) show that capital flow management
is effective at addressing risk-premium shocks.4
This dissertation builds on these recent development in the theoretical liter-
ature on capital flow management. It aims to answer the following two questions:
first, how to conduct capital flow management when there is more than one mar-
3Many argued against capital account liberalization: see e.g. Rodrik, 1998; Bhagwati, 1998;
Stiglitz, 2000.
4Costinot et al. (2014) provide another justification for large economies to employ capital flow
management. They show that large economies could benefit by manipulating inter-temporal terms
of trade with capital flow management.
3
ket imperfection; second, whether capital flow management leads to multilateral
spillover effects.
The first question is normative in nature and it is studied using a welfare-based
analysis in Chapter 2. Specifically, I solve for optimal capital flow management in
an environment with imperfections in both financial and labor markets—households
face borrowing constraint and wage is downwardly rigid. In this analytical frame-
work, capital flows carry both financial and macroeconomic risks. On the one hand,
large capital inflows lead to rapid build-up of debt, increasing the risks of financial
crisis and painful deleveraging in the future. On the other hand, large capital in-
flows are used to finance consumption boom that leads to an unsustainably rise in
real wage, increasing the risk of high levels of unemployment in the future. Both
of which resemble the recent experiences of the periphery countries in the euro area
during the Eurozone crisis.
Moreover, in this model environment, there is a trade-off between macroe-
conomic stability and financial stability when employing capital controls in some
states of nature. For instance, consider a country with high levels of unemployment
and debt. A prudential inflow restriction could bring down the debt level and hence
improve financial stability. However, the same inflow restriction would increase the
cost of borrowing for domestic households and firms. Then aggregate demand would
decrease and unemployment rate would rise. Therefore, the optimal capital control
must strike a balance between safeguarding financial stability and managing ag-
gregate demand. I show that the optimal policy in this environment is to restrict
capital inflows when financial stability risk is high or when economy is overheating,
4
and to restrict capital outflows (or encourage capital inflows) when unemployment
rate is high and when financial risk is low.
The second question is positive in nature and it is examined empirically using
panel analysis in Chapter 3. Specifically, I first identify two potential multilateral
spillover effects of capital flow management in a simple model: inflow restrictions
introduced in one country would deflect capital flows to the other countries (capital
flow deflection), and the higher inflows from the deflection would induce the recipient
countries to respond by increasing their inflow restrictions (policy response).
Then I test these two spillover effects using a dataset consisting of 78 countries
over the period of 1995-2009. I find strong empirical evidence for the capital flow
deflection among countries with similar risk levels, but no evidence for any policy
response. The finding implies that, when Brazil introduced IOF tax in 2009, capital
is only deflected to those countries with similar risk levels as Brazil, in particular
those with similar risk levels. I would like to interpret the lack of evidence for policy
response as a failure to find the evidence rather than the evidence of no policy
response. In Brazil’s example, at least two of the countries with similar risk levels
as Brazil raised their capital controls in response to the IOF tax.5 In 2010, Peru
increased the fee on non-resident purchase of central bank paper to 400 basis points
(from 10 basis points), while Thailand imposed a 15 percent withholding tax on
non-residents’ interest earnings and capital gains on state bonds. Therefore, more
research needs to be done on this topic.
5See Table 3.1 for lists of countries with similar risk levels.
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Chapter 2: Employment and Financial Stability:
Dual Goals of Capital Flow Management
2.1 Introduction
The literature on optimal capital flow management can be divided into two
streams: one focuses on reducing financial stability risks (see e.g. Korinek 2010); the
other focuses on macroeconomic stabilization (see e.g. Farhi and Werning, 2013a
and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2013a).
This chapter brings together the two streams of research by studying how
capital flow management can address both macroeconomic and financial stability
risks. It is important to consider both risks simultaneously since there is a trade-off
between macroeconomic and financial stability. A restriction on capital inflows that
aims to reduce financial stability risk, for instance, could decrease aggregate demand
and eventually worsen unemployment. Moreover, it is relevant to study capital
flow management with dual objectives since some countries, such as the euro area
0This chapter is adapted from my job market paper under the same title. I would also like to
thank Anton Korinek, Cristina Arellano, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Felipe Saffie, Luminita Stevens,
and seminar participants at the University of Maryland, Miami University, Miami University, the
PBC School of Finance, Tsinghua University, the Central University of Finance and Economics,
and Peking University HSBC Business School for their valuable comments and discussions. The
views expressed here are those of the author and all errors are the sole responsibility of the author.
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member states, do not have an independent monetary policy for macroeconomic
stabilization.
To offer normative guidance for designing capital flow management with dual
objectives, I study a small open economy model with a price-dependent borrowing
constraint and a downwardly-rigid wage. On one hand, the borrowing constraint
binds when borrowing capacity falls relative to the level of debt. Once the constraint
binds, capital inflows would stop, resulting in financial crises. Since borrowing ca-
pacity is determined endogenously, financial crises are endogenous in the model.
On the other hand, the downward wage rigidity restricts wage from falling dur-
ing economic downturns, causing unemployment to rise. Since wage is determined
endogenously, unemployment is also endogenous in the model.
A laissez-faire economy suffers from an aggregate demand externality as in
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2013a) and Farhi and Werning (2012, 2013b). The aggre-
gate demand externality arises because private agents fail to internalize the impact
of their individual consumption choices on the labor market. More specifically, they
increase consumption excessively during booms, raising nominal wage and the risk
of future unemployment. On the contrary, agents reduce consumption excessively
during busts, driving down labor demand and causing unemployment to rise im-
mediately. Therefore the laissez-faire economy has a high unemployment rate as a
result of the aggregate demand externality.
A laissez-faire economy also suffers from a pecuniary externality as in Korinek
(2010). The pecuniary externality arises because private agents fail to internalize
the positive impact of their wealth on asset price. More specifically, they carry too
7
much debt into a financial crisis. Had they borrowed less during tranquil times,
the asset price would have been higher during the financial crisis, and the financial
crisis would be less severe. Therefore the laissez-faire economy suffers from frequent
severe financial crises as a result of the pecuniary externality.
I provide an analytical solution for optimal capital flow management in this
environment by solving a constrained social planner’s problem. The planner faces
the same set of constraints as private agents, but he is able to internalize the im-
pacts of individual actions on asset price and the labor market. I provide an explicit
formula for the optimal capital inflow tax (or subsidy) that decentralizes the con-
strained planner’s allocations. Moreover, I show that the optimal tax can be broken
down into three components: one corrects the aggregate demand externality; the
other corrects the pecuniary externality; the third accounts for the interaction of
the two externalities. The first term is counter-cyclical: it is a prudential tax when
the economy has full employment and it is a stimulative subsidy when the economy
has unemployment. The sum of the second and the third terms is a prudential tax
when the probability of a binding borrowing constraint in next period is positive.
Using a novel graphical framework, I illustrate the impacts of a prudential
capital inflow tax on unemployment and financial stability in a laissez-faire economy.
The inflow tax decreases aggregate demand and lowers debt by increasing the cost of
borrowing. A lower level of debt reduces the probability of a financial crisis in next
period. If the initial laissez-faire economy suffers from unemployment, then the lower
aggregate demand increases unemployment. Therefore, there is a trade-off between
employment and financial stability: the inflow tax improves financial stability at
8
the cost of higher unemployment. Thus, a prudential inflow tax is optimal if the
welfare gain of better financial stability outweighs the cost of higher unemployment.
Otherwise, a simulative inflow subsidy is optimal. However, if the initial laissez-faire
economy has full employment, then the lower aggregate demand lowers wage level,
reducing future unemployment. Therefore, inflow tax is optimal since it improves
both financial stability and future employment.
Using quantitative analysis, I show that optimal capital flow management is
able to reduce both unemployment and financial stability risk significantly compared
to the laissez-faire economy. I calibrate the model to the Spanish economy and show
that optimal capital inflow tax lowers average unemployment rate by 2%, reduces
the frequency of severe financial crisis by 6%, and improves permanent consumption
by 1% compared to levels in the laissez-faire economy. Moreover, I find that simple
tax rules also lead to significant improvements in the laissez-faire economy. For
example, a rule that imposes a 4% inflow tax when unemployment rate is below 2%
and no tax when unemployment is above 2% improves permanent consumption by
more than 0.5%.
This chapter builds on a large literature on pecuniary externalities (see e.g.
Korinek, 2010; Bianchi and Mendoza, 2010; Jeanne and Korinek, 2010; Bianchi,
2011; Korinek, 2011a,b; Jeanne and Korinek, 2013; Davila, 2014). These papers
examine the inefficiencies that arise from a price-dependent borrowing constraint
and derive the optimal policies that could mitigate the externality. My paper con-
tributes to this literature by combining it with an aggregate demand externality and
examining the optimal capital policy that corrects both externalities. In addition,
9
my paper also adds to both literatures by providing a novel graphical framework for
conducting comparative statics.
In particular, the downward nominal wage rigidity in my paper builds on the
work of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011, 2012, 2013a,b). These authors investigate
the inefficiencies that arise from the wage rigidity and the optimal policies that can
be used to mitigate these inefficiencies.1 However, their analysis of optimal inflow
tax is numerical in nature. In this chapter, I provide an analytical characterization of
the inefficiency and an explicit solution for the optimal inflow tax. These analytical
results contribute to a better understanding of the ways in which optimal policy
depends on the structural parameters of the economy as well as generating additional
insights into the nature of the aggregate demand externality.
This chapter also contributes to a growing literature that studies the models
with both nominal and financial frictions by providing the first numerical solution
for the laissez-faire equilibrium in a DSGE framework with both nominal and fi-
nancial frictions. The numerical solution is difficult because of non-linearities in
the value function, the large number of state variables, and inequality constraints.
For example, Farhi and Werning (2012, 2013b) and Davis and Presno (2014) study
models with financial and nominal frictions, but these models do not account for
uncertainty. Woodford (2012) studies optimal monetary policy in a reduced-form
model with both financial and nominal frictions. Ottonello (2014) studies exchange
rate policy during financial crises using a model that is similar to the one in this
1In an earlier version, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2013a) include an extension that features
a price-dependent borrowing constraint in addition to the downward wage rigidity and provide
numerical solutions.
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chapter, but he does not solve for the laissez-faire equilibrium.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: in Section 2, I set up the model
and define the laissez-faire equilibrium. In Section 3, I solve a constrained social
planner’s problem, characterize the externalities associated with the frictions, and
derive a formula for the optimal capital inflow tax. Section 4 presents a graphical
framework for comparative statics. In Section 5, I conduct a quantitative analysis
and present numerical results. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Model
Consider a DSGE model of a small open economy with a tradable good and
a non-tradable good. The economy consists of two types agents: a unit mass of
identical households and a unit mass of identical non-tradable goods producers.
There are two sources of exogenous shocks: a stochastic country-specific interest
rate r and a stochastic tradable endowment yT .
2.2.1 Household






where E0 is the expectation function at t = 0. The period utility function follows





1−σ , σ > 0.
The aggregate consumption ct is an Armington-type CES aggregator with the elas-











, ξ < 1, a ∈ (0, 1). (2.2)
I assume the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution is greater than the inter-




so that the marginal utility of cTt , denoted as uT (t), is decreasing in c
N
t .
In each period, the representative household is endowed with yTt units of trad-
able goods and one unit of labor. Let tradable goods be the numeraire. The house-
hold sells labor at real wage wt in the labor market and takes labor demand ht as
given. The household also receives dividend πt from non-tradable producers. In
international financial market, the household has access to a one-period non-state-
contingent bond denominated in tradable goods with country-specific real interest
12





t + dt−1 = y
T




where dt is real outstanding debt due in period t + 1, p
N
t is the relative price of
non-tradable goods in units of tradable goods, which is also real exchange rate.
The household is subject to a borrowing constraint imposed by international
lenders that outstanding debt can not exceed a fraction κ of household income:2
dt ≤ κ(yTt + wtht + πt) (2.5)
The borrowing constraint (2.5) is not formally derived as a feature of an opti-
mal credit contract; it is an ad-hoc financial constraint that has become standard in
the literature of the financial crisis of small open economies (see e.g. Mendoza, 2002;
Korinek, 2010). Mendoza (2002) provides two rationales for the ad-hoc borrowing
constraint. First, it could result from an optimal credit contract under traditional
financial-market frictions such as monitoring costs or bankruptcy risks. The in-
tuition is that the borrowing constraint could be thought of as a mechanism to
manage default risk by limiting the ability of borrowers to acquire debt based on
their income. In fact, in the calibration exercise of Section 2.5, borrowers’ realized
2I have also solved the model using an alternative borrowing constraint:
dt
1+rt
≤ κ(yTt + wtht + πt)
Most results continue to hold except that the laissez-faire equilibrium allocations are independent
of state variable rt when the borrowing constraint binds. Then higher interest rate does not lead
to more deleveraging or lower consumption during crisis.
13
incomes are always high enough to repay their debts in full thanks to the borrowing
constraint.
The second rationale behind the borrowing constraint is that it is consistent
with standard lending criteria widely used in mortgage and consumer loans. For
instance, the Federal Housing Administration of the United States imposes a debt-
to-income ratio of 31% on mortgage payment.3 In particular, the total mortgage
payment (principal and interest, escrow deposits for taxes, hazard insurance, mort-
gage insurance premium, homeowners’ dues, etc.) cannot exceed 31% of the gross
monthly income. Therefore, despite the lack of micro-foundation, the borrowing
constraint (2.5) has become standard in the literature to capture financial-market
frictions.
The household’s problem is to choose stochastic process {cTt , cNt , dt}∞t=0 to max-
imize expected lifetime welfare (2.1) subject to the budget constraint (2.4) and the
borrowing constraint (2.5) while taking {pNt , yTt , wt, ht, πt, rt}∞t=0 and the initial out-
standing debt d0 as given.










uT (t) = (1 + rt)βEtuT (t+ 1) + (1 + rt)λ
CC
t (2.7)
where λCCt is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint (2.5).
Equation (2.6) defines the real exchange rate as a function of tradable and
3See http://www.fha.com/fha requirements debt.
14
non-tradable consumption. (2.7) is the household’s Euler equation. It sets the
households’s marginal utility of an additional unit of tradable consumption to its
marginal cost. The cost of higher tradable consumption includes both lower a re-
duction in future consumption and a deterioration of today’s borrowing constraint
as more debt is necessary to finance the higher tradable consumption today.
2.2.2 Non-tradable Goods Producer
I assume there is a unit mass of identical firms that produces non-tradable
goods using labor as the only input. The firms are price-takers in both input and
output markets. Therefore, a representative firm’s problem is to choose ht in each









The firm’s optimal labor demand decision sets the marginal cost of labor equal to







I assume wage is rigid. Specifically, I follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2013a)
by imposing a downwardly rigid constraint on nominal wages
Wt ≥ γWt−1
so that nominal wage Wt can never fall below a fraction γ of previous period’s
nominal level Wt−1. I also assume the economy to have fixed exchange rate, then
nominal rigidity becomes real rigidity:
wt ≥ γwt−1 (2.9)
Henceforth, I refer to (2.9) as the wage rigidity constraint and γwt−1 as the wage
floor.
In the labor market, labor demand must not exceed labor supply
ht ≤ 1 (2.10)
Last, complementary slackness condition must be satisfied
(1− ht)(wt − γwt−1) = 0 (2.11)
Equation (2.11) guarantees at least one of inequalities (2.9) and (2.10) must hold
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at equality.4 So when the wage rigidity constraint is slack, the economy has full
employment.
2.2.4 Market Clearing
Finally the non-tradable goods market must clear:
cNt = f(ht) (2.12)
2.2.5 Laissez-faire Equilibrium
Definition 1 (Definition of Laissez-faire Equilibrium) Given stochastic shocks
{yTt , rt}∞t=0 and initial outstanding debt d−1, the laissez-faire equilibrium consists of
stochastic process {cTt , cNt , ht, pNt , wt, dt, λCCt }∞t=0 that satisfy (2.6) -(2.16):
dt = (1 + rt)
(
cTt + dt−1 − yTt
)
(2.13)
λCCt ≥ 0 (2.14)










To simplify notation, I drop time subscripts in the rest of the chapter. I
denote the variables of the subsequent period with superscript ′, the variables of
4It also guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Consider when (2.11) is not imposed as
an equilibrium condition, then there can be an infinite number of equilibria when full employment
wage (the wage that clears the labor market at full employment) is larger than the wage floor:
every wage equal or larger than the full employment wage is an equilibrium.
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the previous period with subscript −1, and variables associated with tradable goods
and non-tradable goods with subscripts T and N respectively.
2.2.6 Unemployment and Aggregate Demand
Proposition 1 (Tradable Consumption and Unemployment) The economy has










If cT is below ĉT , then unemployment increases in w−1 and decreases in cT .
Proof First prove that if cT ≥ ĉT then h = 1 by contradiction.
Suppose h < 1 when cT ≥ ĉT . Then w = γw−1. Substitute (2.6) and (2.12) into
(2.8):




Substitute cT ≥ ĉT , h < 1, and (2.17) into (2.18) gives w > γw−1. which contradicts
with w = γw−1. Therefore h = 1 when cT ≥ ĉT .
Next prove that if h = 1 then cT ≥ ĉT . If h = 1 then w > γw−1. Substitute






Rearranging terms gives cT ≥ ĉT . Therefore, h = 1 if and only if cT ≥ ĉT .
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Given what I have shown above, if cT < ĉT , then h < 1. When h < 1,

















> 0 and dh
dw−1
< 0 when cT < ĉT .
Proposition 1 shows that equilibrium unemployment is determined by previous
period’s real wage and contemporaneous aggregate tradable consumption. Higher
w−1 pushes up real wage floor and increases the cost of labor. Producers respond
to higher cost by decreasing employment. cT should be interpreted as the aggregate
demand for tradable goods. Lower aggregate demand for tradable goods must lead
to lower aggregate demand for the non-tradable goods at initial pN . Then pN must
fall to clear the incipient excess supply of non-tradable goods. Meanwhile, firms
would respond to the lower price by reducing production, and hence unemployment
increases. Intuitively, the economy suffers from unemployment when the aggregate
demand is insufficient (less than ĉT ), and lower the aggregate demand, the worse
the unemployment is.
ĉT is the full-employment-threshold of aggregate tradable consumption. When
aggregate tradable consumption is above the threshold, the economy has full em-
ployment. Then higher demand would not reduce unemployment. Instead, it leads
to higher real wage, which increases future unemployment.
There is a trade-off between financial stability and employment in the model.
On the one hand, lower debt reduces the probability of a binding borrowing con-
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straint in next period, decreasing financial stability risk. On the other hand, lower
debt implies lower contemporaneous aggregate consumption, increasing unemploy-
ment when the aggregate demand is insufficient. Households do not internalize their
individual actions on aggregate variables, therefore the trade-off between financial
stability and employment might be inefficient in the laissez-faire equilibrium, provid-
ing a rationale for capital flow management that takes both objectives into account.
2.3 Optimal Capital Flow Management
2.3.1 Constrained Planner’s Problem
A constrained planner directly sets allocations cT , h, and d, but it is subject
to the same set of constraints private agents face. Moreover, the planner is subject
to the laws of supply and demand in goods and labor markets, so it must take the
market determination of real exchange rate and real wage as given. The planner
differs from private agents in its ability to internalize the impacts of allocations on
price and wage levels. More specifically, the constrained planner’s problem can be
expressed in following recursive form:
V CP (w−1, d−1, yT , r) = max
cT ,h,d
u (cT , f(h)) + βEV









− cT − d−1 = 0, (2.22)
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d ≤ κ [yT + pN (cT , h) f(h)] , (2.23)
w(cT , h) ≥ γw−1, (2.24)
[w(cT , h)− γw−1] (1− h) = 0, (2.25)
where














The planner takes resource constraints (2.21) and (2.22), borrowing constraint
(2.23), wage rigidity constraint (2.24), complementary slackness condition (2.25),
real exchange rate function (2.26) and real wage function (2.27) as given. Since
the wage rigidity depends on the previous period’s wage, therefore w−1 is a state
variable in the planner’s problem.
Definition 2 (Constrained-Optimal Allocations) Constrained-optimal alloca-
tions consist of allocation rules
{
cCPT (w−1, d−1, yT , r), c
CP
N (w−1, d−1, yT , r), d
CP (w−1, d−1, yT , r)
}
that solve the recursive optimization problem of a constrained planner.
Henceforth, I use superscript LF and CP to denote laissez-faire equilibrium
allocations and constrained-optimal allocations respectively.
2.3.2 Aggregate Demand and Pecuniary Externalities
Following the literature (see e.g. Bianchi, 2011), I call an equilibrium constrained-
inefficient if it deviates from the constrained-optimal allocations. Below, I first focus
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on the constrained-inefficiency of laissez-faire economy associated with wage rigidity
by letting borrowing constraints be slack:
Proposition 2 (Aggregate Demand Externality) When borrowing constraints
are slack, the laissez-faire equilibrium cLFT and d
LF are lower than the constrained-
optimal levels if ΦCPT > β(1 + r)EΦ
CP ′
T , and higher if Φ
CP








> 0 when cT < ĉT
−βEλ′wγ dwdcT ≤ 0 when cT ≥ ĉT .
Proof When borrowing constraints are slack, the constrained planner’s Euler equa-
tion can be expressed as





See Appendix A.1 for detailed derivation. Then




T ≷ β(1 + r)EΦ
CP ′
T .
On the other hand, the households in the laissez-faire economy set
uLFT = β(1 + r)Eu
LF ′
T . (2.28)
Therefore when ΦCPT > β(1 + r)EΦ
CP ′
T , the constrained-optimal consumption must
be higher than the laissez-faire equilibrium levels, and hence debt is also higher.
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And the opposite is true when ΦCPT < β(1 + r)EΦ
CP ′
T .
When borrowing constraints are slack, the planner’s marginal benefits of trad-
able consumption includes the direct increase in utility uT and the indirect change
in utility ΦT . This indirect term, not considered by private agents, captures how an
increase in cT affects labor market.
It follows from Proposition 1 that cT affects both contemporaneous and future
labor markets. When cT is insufficient, an additional unit of cT increases employment
by dh
dcT
, so non-tradable consumption increases by f ′(h) dh
dcT




. When cT is sufficiently high, an additional unit of cT increases real
wage by dw
dcT
and tightens next period’s wage rigidity by γ dw
dcT
, which has a shadow






The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that the constrained planner would al-
locate more tradable consumption (compared to the private agents in laissez-faire
economy) to the period when it can improve unemployment the most. Therefore,
private agents under-consume and under-borrow relative to the constrained planner
when higher cT could improve unemployment more than higher c
′
T , otherwise they
over-consume and over-borrow.
The aggregate demand externality arises because private agents fail to inter-
nalize the impacts of aggregate tradable consumption on present and future labor
markets, which is the nature of aggregate demand externality.5
5The literature has focused on the inter-temporal channel. For example, Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2013a) explain the nature of the externality associated with the wage rigidity as “the
excessive expansion of private absorption in response to favorable shocks, causing inefficiently
large increases in real wages”. The authors describe the inefficiency in the laissez-faire economy as
23
The size of aggregate demand externality ΦT is decreasing in ξ and increasing























is decreasing in f(h). So the higher the unemployment, the higher is the
marginal benefit of higher cT from improving unemployment. And by equation
(2.19), unemployment is increasing in γ. Therefore, when aggregate tradable con-
sumption is insufficient, ΦT is positive and it is increasing in γ . When the aggregate
tradable consumption is sufficient, ΦT < 0 and it is decreasing in γ. So the size of
aggregate demand externality term ΦT is always increasing in γ.
Next, I let wage rigidity constraints be slack and focus on the inefficiency
associated with the financial friction only. Since following results are standard in
the literature (see e.g. Korinek, 2010, and Bianchi, 2012), I keep discussion brief.
When present borrowing constraint binds, the laissez-faire equilibrium allo-
cations are generally identical to the constrained-optimal levels.6 So the planner
would go through the same deleveraging process as private households do. The
“over-borrowing”. However, there could be excessive decline of private absorption (in response to
adverse shocks) as well, causing inefficiently large increases in unemployment. In other words, there
could be either “under-borrowing” or “over-borrowing” in the laissez-faire equilibrium compared
to the constrained-optimal allocations due to the wage rigidity.
6cT , h, and d are determined by the same set of equations: (2.21)-(2.27) with (2.23) at equality.
The household is also subject to the constraint on Euler equation
uT ≥ β(1 + r)EuCP
′
T ,
while the planner is not. However, the planner almost always chooses the allocations that satisfy
the household’s Euler equation constraint unless debt deflation process is extremely severe, in
which case it would increase leverage instead of deleveraging.
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result holds even when the wage rigidity constraints bind. One could rationalize
this result by observing that government policies are usually ineffective in stopping
sudden stops.7 For the rest of the discussion in this subsection, I assume present
borrowing constraint to be slack.
When there is a positive probability of a binding borrowing constraint in next
period, the laissez-faire tradable consumption and debt levels are higher compared
to the constrained-optimal levels. Inefficiency arises because private agents fail to
internalize the benefit of higher future tradable consumption from relaxing future
borrowing constraint. Higher tradable consumption relaxes borrowing constraint
by boosting real household income. Let Ψ(cT , h) = κ [pN(cT , h)f(h) + yT ], and ΨT
denotes the first derivatives of Ψ with respect to cT . Then λCCΨT measures the
marginal benefit of tradable consumption from relaxing the borrowing constraint.
borrowing constraint also depends on the level of employment. Denote Ψh as
the first derivative of Ψ with respect to h. Then Ψh < 0 since ξ < 1. The model
in Ottonello (2014) has a “unemployment-credit access trade-off” because Ψh < 0.
However, this trade-off is absent in my model. In my model, Ψh is only a partial
equilibrium effect, and it is dominated by a general equilibrium effect of opposite
direction. More specifically, cT must fall in order for unemployment to rise (see
Proposition 1), so the general equilibrium effect of an extra unit of unemployment
on the borrowing capacity is λCC [−Ψh − ΨT dcTdh ], which is less than or equal to
7Governments still try to stop or alleviate these deleveraging process despite they usually do
not work. For example, the “fragile five” introduced various measures, including raising interest
rates and capital controls, when international investors took capital out with the expectation of
higher U.S. interest rates due to the Fed’s tapering of Q.E.
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0.8 While in Ottonello’s model, dcT
dh
= 0, therefore the impact of unemployment
on borrowing constraint is −λCCΨh > 0. The reason is that aggregate demand
externality is absent from Ottonello (2014) since he assume flexible exchange rates
which undo the nominal friction.
Finally, I consider the case that both constraints bind:
Proposition 3 (Dual Externalities) When both constraints bind, laissez-faire equi-
librium allocations cLFT and d
LF are lower than the constrained-optimal levels if











and higher otherwise. (2.30) is evaluated at the constrained planner’s allocations.
Proof When λCC = 0 and Eλ′CC > 0, the constrained planner’s Euler equation
becomes
















uCPT < β(1 + r)Eu
CP ′
T .
Compare (2.31) to the private agent’s Euler equation (2.28), the constrained-optimal
level of cT must be higher than the laissez-faire level, so debt level must also be
higher. When unemployment is positive, higher cT also implies higher h. The
opposite is true when the inequality of (2.30) holds in opposite direction.












Proposition 3 encapsulates the optimal trade-off between macroeconomic and
financial stability. If the marginal welfare gains of better employment (by increas-
ing cT ) outweighs the marginal welfare loss of higher financial stability risk (from
the higher debt to finance cT ), then planner would increase consumption and bor-
row more relative to the laissez-faire economy. Otherwise the planner decreases
consumption and borrow less.
The left hand side of equation (2.30) measures the marginal effect of cT on
welfare through its impact on unemployment. It could be either positive or nega-
tive: it is positive when present unemployment is more severe than expected future
unemployment, and it is negative when expected future unemployment is more se-
vere. When the marginal welfare effect is positive, there is a trade-off between
macroeconomic and financial stability: higher cT improves labor market but in-
creases financial stability risk. When the marginal welfare effect is negative, there is
no trade-off between macroeconomic and financial stability: higher cT deteriorates
both unemployment and financial stability.
The right hand side of equation (2.30) is the marginal welfare loss of cT from
deteriorating financial stability, and it consists of two terms since lower c′T affects
the borrowing capacity function Ψ(c′T , h
′) through both input arguments. The first
term Ψ′T is positive since higher c
′






negative when c′T < ĉT
′, since lower c′T lowers h
′, which improves asset price. The
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when cT ≥ ĉT .
(2.32)










≥ 0, and lower
debt always leads to an improvement in financial stability. It is clear from the
expressions in (2.32) that the pecuniary externality term is increasing in κ and
decreasing in ξ.
2.3.3 Optimal Capital Inflow Tax
A capital inflow tax could be used to correct the constrained-inefficiencies by
implementing the constrained optimal allocations in the laissez-faire economy. Let-
ting τ be a tax charged on debt, then the Euler equation in a regulated decentralized
equilibrium is:
uT = (1 + r)(1 + τ)βEtu
′
T + (1 + r)(1 + τ)λ
CC .
Proposition 4 (Optimal Capital Inflow Tax) The constrained-optimal alloca-
tions can be implemented in the decentralized economy by imposing tax τ (subsidy if






















β(1 + r)EuCP ′T
, (2.33)
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where (2.33) is evaluated at the constrained-optimal allocations.
Proof See Appendix A.2.
When present borrowing constraint is slack, the optimal capital inflow tax is
non-zero and it corrects the constrained-inefficiencies in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
When present borrowing constraint binds, the optimal capital inflow tax is zero as
the constrained-optimal allocations are identical to the laissez-faire equilibrium.
τ can be broken down into three terms: τAD corrects for the aggregate de-
mand externality; τFS corrects for the pecuniary externality; τAD,FS corrects for


































If wage rigidity is the only source of friction in the model (e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe, 2013a), then the optimal capital inflow tax simplifies to τAD. If the price-
dependent borrowing constraint is the only source of friction in the model (e.g.
Korinek, 2010), then the optimal capital inflow tax simplifies to τFS.
τAD is counter-cyclical: it is negative when present unemployment is high and
positive when the economy has full employment. In other words, it is a stimula-
tive subsidy (to encourage capital inflows) during economic downturns, and it is a
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prudential tax (to restrict capital inflows) during booms.
Since the size of ΦT is increasing in γ and decreasing in ξ, a higher γ or a lower
ξ implies a more volatile τAD. Intuitively, a higher γ and a lower ξ increase the
marginal effect of tradable consumption on both employment and wage. Therefore,
they require a larger prudential tax during booms and a larger stimulative subsidy
during recessions to correct the aggregate demand externality.
τFS is prudential and it is acyclical. τFS is positive when the probability of
a binding borrowing constraint in next period is positive, otherwise it is zero. The
borrowing constraint in the next period is more likely to bind when debt level is
higher. Therefore, τFS is a prudential policy to restrict capital inflows when debt is
high. Moreover, since debt could increase during both booms and recessions, τFS is
acyclical.9
The interaction term τAD,FS partially offsets the prudential tax τFS. A binding
borrowing constraint usually leads to unemployment, so τAD,FS < 0 when τFS >
0. Then the sum τFS + τFS,AD < τFS. By equation (2.32), τFS + τFS,AD ≥ 0,
and τFS + τFS,AD is increasing in κ and decreasing in ξ. Intuitively, higher κ and
lower ξ increases the marginal effect of tradable consumption on the borrowing
capacity. Therefore, they require a larger prudential tax for correcting the pecuniary
externality when debt level is high.
9τFS could in fact be pro-cyclical. The borrowing constraint is more likely to bind when the
economy is hit by an adverse shock in next period. Given the persistence of shocks, the risk of
a future binding borrowing constraint is higher when the economy is hit by an adverse shock in
the present period compared to a favorable shock (assuming they lead to the same debt level).
Therefore, τFS is higher when the economy is hit by an adverse shock.
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Finally, when there is a trade-off between macroeconomic and financial stabil-
ity, the optimal policy is a prudential tax on inflows when financial stability is the
dominant concern, and it is a stimulative subsidy on inflows (or a tax on outflow)
when macroeconomic stability is the dominant concern.
2.4 Graphical Analysis
In this section, I first provide a graphical framework of the theoretical model.
Then I use it to analyze the impacts of an inflow tax in a laissez-faire economy.
2.4.1 Graphical Framework: EE,WR and CC Curves
The graphical framework focuses on the decentralized partial equilibrium in a
given period. A partial equilibrium consists of two endogenous variables h and ct
for given exogenous variables {d−1, w−1, τ, r, yT , c′T , h′}. An equilibrium pair (h∗, c∗T )
is determined by the intersections of three curves, which are described below.
The first curve captures the inter-temporal optimality at equilibrium. Since it
is derived from the Euler equation, I denote it as EE and define it below.
Definition 3 (EE Curve) Given {r, τ, c′T , h′}, EE is the collection of all the pos-
itive employment-consumption bundles (h, cT ) that satisfy:
(cT )
−1/ξ [c(cT , h







It is clear from equation (2.34) that EE is downward-sloping as in Figure 2.1
for given {r, τ, c′T , h′} under the assumption of equation 2.3. When the borrowing
constraint is slack, equilibrium (h∗, c∗T ) lies on EE. When the borrowing constraint
is binding, equilibrium (h∗, c∗T ) lies below EE. Therefore equilibrium (h
∗, c∗T ) never
lies above EE curve.
Figure 2.1: Graphical Framework: EE,WR and CC Curves
Table 3: Moments from Simulation
Laissez-faire Optimal Laissez-faire Optimal capital control
capital control (no wage rigidity) (no wage rigidity)
Capital Inflow Tax 0.00 (0.00) 8.2 (3.21) 0.00 (0.00) 5.67 (3.47)
Aggregate Consumption 0.97 (0.06) 0.99 (0.02) 0.99 (0.03) 0.99 (0.02)
Unemployment Rate 3.10 (6.44) 0.16 (0.99) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
GDP 3.13 (0.25) 3.13 (0.17) 3.12 (0.29) 3.13 (0.23)
Real Exchange Rate 2.18 (0.15) 2.13 (0.13) 2.12 (0.25) 2.12 (0.19)
Real Wage 1.65 (0.11) 1.06 (0.1) 1.59 (0.19) 1.59 (0.14)
Trade Balance 0.04 (0.06) 0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.07) 0.04 (0.04)
Current Account 0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.04)
Debt 0.90 (0.06) 0.80 (0.03) 0.89 (0.07) 0.87 (0.05)
Domestic Price 3.18 (0.15) 3.13 (0.14) 3.12 (0.26) 3.12 (0.19)
Inflation Rate 0.11 (4.8) 0.03 (2.51) 0.87 (13.84) 0.27 (7.48)
Table 4: Add caption
Optimal ⌧ Spain
Laissez-faire Optimal ⌧ (no WR) 1980-1998 1999-2013 Full sample
Correlation with GDP
Aggregate consumption 0.89 0.95 0.99 0.92 0.92 0.92
Unemployment rate -0.74 -0.29 0.00 -0.77 -0.90 -0.83
Current account -0.67 0.10 -0.54 -0.68 -0.90 -0.78
Trade balance -0.81 -0.40 -0.74 -0.74 -0.80 -0.77
Correlation with Optimal capital inflow tax
Country-specific interest rate -0.75 -0.07
GDP 0.32 -0.19
Unemployment rate -0.14 0.00

















Note: EE is defined in Definition 3. WR is defined in Definition 4. CC is defined in
Definition 5.
EE shifts toward the origin when r or τ increases, or when c′T or h
′ decreases.
Intuitively, households would like to consume more tomorrow and less today when
domestic real interest rate is higher. And effective domestic gross real interest rate
faced by the households is (1 + r)(1 + τ). Therefore today’s aggregate demand goes
down when r or τ increases, and lower aggregate demand is represented by an inward
shift of EE.
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The second curve captures the nominal friction in the model and it is derived
from the wage rigidity constraint. So I denote the curve as WR and it is defined
below:
Definition 4 (WR Curve) Given w−1, WR is the set of all the positive employment-
















T when cT ≤ ĉT
1 when cT ≥ ĉT .
(2.35)
WR consists of two segments: an upward sloping segment when cT < ĉT and
a vertical segment when cT ≥ ĉT . The wage rigidity constraint binds and there is
involuntary unemployment on the upward sloping segment, while the wage rigidity
constraint is slack and economy is in full employment on the vertical segment. See
the Proof of Proposition 1 for a detailed derivation of equation (2.35).
The kink point (ĉT , 1) and the upward sloping segment ofWR would shift down
if w−1 decreases. Intuitively, a lower γw−1 relaxes the downward wage rigidity, hence
it should be easier for economy to reach full employment. That is, the minimum
tradable consumption required to reach full employment must be lower. Thus, the
kink point and the upward-sloping segment of WR are also lower.
The third curve in the graphical framework captures the financial friction.
Since it is derived from the borrowing constraint, so I denote it as CC. It is defined
below:
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Definition 5 (CC Curve) Given {r, yT , d−1}, CC is the set of all the positive
employment-consumption bundles (h, cT ) that satisfy









CC slices the (h, cT ) space into two regions. The borrowing constraint is
not satisfied at allocations in the shaded area to the right of CC. In the shaded
area, real household income is too low to secure the level of debt needed to finance
consumption, so the household must deleverage.10 Henceforth I refer to the shaded
area as the deleveraging area. The borrowing constraint is satisfied at equality on
CC where real household income is just high enough to secure the debt (1 + r)(cT −
yT + d−1). The borrowing constraint is slack to the left of CC where real household
income is more than enough to secure the debt. Equation (2.36) is derived by
substituting equations (2.6) and (2.13) into borrowing constraint (2.15) at equality.
CC is U -shaped with the opening facing to the right as illustrated in Figure














10The statement depends on the assumption that ξ < 1. If ξ > 1, then the deleveraging area is
the area to the left of CC.
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The debt deflationary process is extremely severe on the upward sloping segment
of CC since one unit reduction in cT decreases borrowing capacity by more than it
decreases debt.
Following the literature (see e.g. Korinek and Mendoza, 2014), I focus on
the equilibrium space below cinflectT by assuming moderate values for κ and ξ. As
a result, the planner would not intervene during financial crisis and choose to go
through the same deleveraging process as the households.
CC shifts toward the origin when d−1 or r increases, or when yT decreases.
Intuitively, the borrowing constraint must be binding at more sets of (h, cT ) when
initial level of outstanding debt or real interest rate increases, or when real income
that can be used to secure debt decreases. So the deleveraging area must expand
and it follows that CC must shift toward the origin.
2.4.2 Determination of the Partial Equilibrium
The partial equilibrium is determined jointly by three curves. The intersection
of EE and WR is an equilibrium point if it lies outside the deleveraging area. Oth-
erwise, the intersection of WR and CC that lies below EE is the equilibrium point
of the model. See Appendix A.3 for the proof of the existence and the uniqueness
of the partial equilibrium.
Figure 2.2 shows four cases of equilibrium that differ by the set of constraints
that bind. In panels A and B, the equilibrium is determined by the intersection of
EE and WR, point A, since it lies outside the deleveraging area. The borrowing
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Figure 2.2: Four Cases of Equilibrium
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A. Neither contraint binds.
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Note: The deleveraging area is indicated by the shaded area. Equilibrium is at point A
in panels A and B. And equilibrium is at point B in panels C and D.
constraint is slack at the equilibrium in both panels. The downward wage rigidity
is slack in Panel A since the equilibrium point lies on the full employment segment
of WR, and the wage rigidity constraint binds in panel B, since point A lies on the
involuntary segment of WR.
In panels C and D, point A is inside the deleveraging area. Therefore, the
equilibrium is determined by the intersection of CC and WR that lies below EE,
point B, and the borrowing constraint binds at the equilibrium in both panels. The
wage rigidity constraint is slack in Panel C since point B lies on the full employment
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segment of WR, and the wage rigidity constraint binds in Panel D since its point
B is on the involuntary unemployment segment of WR.
2.4.3 Impacts of Capital Inflow Tax in a Laissez-faire Economy
Below I consider the introduction of an inflow tax in a laissez-fare economy and
evaluate its static impact in the present period and the dynamic effect in subsequent
period using the graphical framework laid out in the previous subsection.
Within-period Impacts of Capital Inflow Tax
Figure 2.3 plots the impact of the introduction of a positive τ in laissez-faire
economies. As in Figure 2.2, there are four cases of laissez-faire economies depending
on the binding constraints. Let the solid lines represent curves in the laissez-faire
economy.
A small inflow tax shifts EE out to EE ′. When the borrowing constraint
binds at the laissez-faire equilibrium (see panels C and D), a small outward shift
of EE has no real impact. When the borrowing constraint is slack at the laissez-
faire equilibrium (see panels A and B), the equilibrium moves from point A to
A′. Therefore the inflow tax reduces cT and hence d. And when the wage rigidity
constraint binds (panel B), the inflow tax also reduces h. w decreases in panel A
but not in panel B.11
If a large inflow tax is introduced, then a slack wage rigidity constraint could
11The inflow tax also has general equilibrium effect: a lower debt implies a higher c′T , which
partially offsets some of the inward shift in EE.
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Figure 2.3: Impacts of A Small Capital Inflow Tax in Laissez-faire Economy
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Note: The deleveraging area is indicated by shaded area. The solid lines represent a laissez-
faire economy. The dash lines represent the impacts of the inflow tax. The superscript ’
indicates the new equilibrium points under the inflow tax.
become binding, causing unemployment. Consider the full employment laissez-faire
economies in panels A and C: a large inflow tax would cause a large downward shift
in CC, moving decentralized economies from panel A to B, and from panel C to D.
To conclude, a small inflow tax decreases tradable consumption and debt lev-
els when the borrowing constraint is slack at the laissez-faire equilibrium, it also
decreases wage if the wage rigidity constraint is also slack at the laissez-faire equilib-
rium, and it increases unemployment when the wage aridity binds at the laissez-faire
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equilibrium. A large inflow tax tightens the wage rigidity constraint, and decreases
tradable consumption, debt, real wage, and employment.
The inflow tax in the present period could have dynamic effects in next period
through lower debt level and lower real wage, which I discuss below separately.
Impacts of Lower Initial Debt
Figure 2.4 shows the impact of a small decrease in d−1 in decentralized economies.
Lower d−1 shifts CC outward to CC
′. If the borrowing constraint is slack at initial
equilibrium (panels A and B), there is no real impact. If the borrowing constraint
binds at initial equilibrium (panels C and D), cT increases since constrained house-
holds could borrow more. When the wage constraint also binds (panel D), h also
increases because of the aggregate demand externality.12
If the decrease in d−1 is large, then a binding borrowing constraint could
become slack. Consider financially constrained economies in panels C and D, a
large outward shift of CC move the economies from panel C to A, and from D to
B, and the economy avoids financial crisis.
Impacts of Lower Initial Real Wage
Figure 2.5 shows the impact of a small decrease in w−1 in laissez-faire economies.
Lower w−1 shifts WR down to WR
′. If the economy has full employment at initial
equilibrium panels A and C), there is no real impact. If the economy has unemploy-
12The smaller d−1 also have general equilibrium effect: c
′
T should increase. Therefore EE shifts
outward, leading to higher cT in panel A and B, and higher h in panel B.
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Figure 2.4: Comparative Statics: d−1 ↓
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Note: The deleveraging area is indicated by the shaded area. The solid lines represent the
initial economy. The dash lines represent the impacts of the lower d−1. The superscript ’
indicates the new equilibrium points.
ment at initial equilibrium (panels B and D), h increases and cT decreases.
13
If the decrease in w−1 is large, then a binding wage rigidity constraint could
become slack. Consider economies with unemployment in panels B and D, a large
downward shift of WR move the economies from panel B to A, and from D to C,
where the economies would be in full employment at the new equilibrium.
13The lower w−1 also have general equilibrium effect in panel B: lower d increases c
′
T , which
shifts EE out, offsetting some of the decrease in cT and increasing h by even more.
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Figure 2.5: Comparative Statics: w−1 ↓
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Note: The deleveraging area is indicated by the shaded area. The solid lines represent
initial economy. The dash lines represent the impacts of the lower w−1. The superscript
’ indicates the new equilibrium points.
Dynamic Impacts of Capital Inflow Tax in a Laissez-fare Economy
Table 2.1 summarizes the impacts of the introduction of a small inflow tax
on employment and borrowing constraint in the laissez-faire economies for different
combinations of binding constraints. Table 2.1 omits the case of a binding borrowing
constraint in the present period because a small inflow tax has no real impact in the
laissez-faire economy.
The first row of Table 2.1 shows that an inflow tax improves either future
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Table 2.1: Impacts of a (Small) Capital Inflow Tax on Employment and the bor-
rowing constraint
Next Period
CC’ slack, CC’ slack, CC’ binds, CC’ binds,
WR’ slack. WR’ binds. WR’ slack. WR’ binds.
CC slack, No Impact. h’ ↑. CC’ relaxes. CC’ relaxes,
WR slack. h’ ↑.
Present
Period CC slack, h ↓. h ↓, h ↓, h ↓,
WR binds. h’ ↑. CC’ relaxes. CC’ relaxes,
h’ ↑.
Note: WR denotes the wage rigidity constraint. CC denotes the borrowing constraint. h
denotes employment. The superscript ’ denotes the variables in next period. ↑ denotes an
increase in employment and ↓ denotes a decrease in employment.
unemployment or financial stability or both in the laissez-faire economy when both
constraints are slack in the present period and one of the constraint binds in the
subsequent period. The second row of Table 2.1 shows the benefits of an inflow tax
on future employment and financial stability persists, but at a cost of higher current
unemployment. Therefore, an inflow tax is desirable when present unemployment
is low. Since an inflow subsidy has the opposite effect as an inflow tax, an inflow
subsidy is desirable when present unemployment is high.
2.5 Quantitative Analysis
This section solves the model presented in Section 2 numerically and quantifies
the welfare improvements of capital flow management.
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2.5.1 Parameter Calibration
I calibrate the model at annual frequency using Spain’s data from 1980-2013.
Table 2.2 shows the benchmark calibration. The sample period starts in 1980 be-
cause of the data availability.14 More specifically, β and κ are calibrated so that net
international investment position (NIIP) to GDP ratio and the frequency of sudden
stops in simulated laissez-faire economy match with those moments from the Span-
ish data. Since the NIIP data are only available from 1992, I construct the NIIP
from 1980-1991 using net flow data. The sample average NIIP-GDP ratio of Spain
is -28%.15 Since NIIP equals to debt level in the model, the time discount factor β
is calibrated to 0.92 so that the long-term average debt-GDP ratio in the simulated
laissez-faire economy is 28%.16
Following Forbes and Warnock (2012), I define sudden stops as episodes with
gross inflows exceeding one standard deviation, where gross inflows are the sum of
net portfolio investment liabilities, other liabilities, and net foreign direct invest-
ment.17 The frequency of sudden stops is 6% during the sample period in Spain,
14See Table D.1 for data source.
15To focus on private liability, I exclude official loans from NIIP by deducting (net) “Other
Investment, Liabilities, General Government (Excludes Exceptional Financing)”. The exclusion
of official loans lowers NIIP significantly. The NIIP reported in IFS is -98.2% of GDP in 2013.
After I exclude official loans, the number becomes -72% of GDP. See Figure D.1 in the appendix
for a comparison of the reconstructed NIIP and reported NIIP. In reality, a large proportion of
the increase in foreign liabilities during the financial crisis was in the form of official loans to the
government. See Figure D.2 in the appendix for a comparison of household’s debt and public debt
levels.
16Prior to 1998, the exchange rate regime of Spain could be not characterized as a fixed exchange
rate during the entire sample period as the currency depreciated against Deutsch Mark numerous
times (see Bacchetta 1997). Fortunately, the long-term average debt-GDP ratio in the simulated
laissez-faire economy with the benchmark calibration when the wage rigidity is dropped (equivalent
to having an optimal flexible exchange rate) is also about 28%.
17Since Forbes and Warnock (2012) use quarterly data, they use the two standard deviation
cut-off line. In contrast, I use annual data, so I lower the cutoff line to one standard deviation like
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Table 2.2: Baseline Parameter Calibration
Parameter Value Description
β 0.92 Discount factor
ξ 0.83 Intra-temporal Elasticity of substitution
κ 0.32 Share of income that is used to secure debt
γ 0.96 Degree of downward wage rigidity
σ 2 Inverse of inter-temporal elasticity of consumption
α 0.75 Labor share in the non-tradable goods sector
a 0.31 Share of tradable
Note: Parameters are calibrated to Spain’s data at annual frequency.
which is similar to the average level found in a panel study by Eichengreen et al.
(2006).18 κ is calibrated to 0.32 so the frequency of sudden stops is also 6% in the
simulated laissez-faire economy.
ξ and γ are calibrated to the values found in empirical literature. Empirical
literature finds ξ to be between 0.40 and 0.83.19 Since a lower ξ implies a more
severe debt-deflationary process, I set ξ at the upper bound 0.83 as a conservative
estimate of debt deflationary process. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2013a) find γ to be
between 0.99 and 1.02 using quarterly data from Argentina and Europe. I use the
lower bound 0.99 as a conservative estimate of the wage rigidity. Since my model
has annual frequency, then γ is set to 0.96.
The rest of parameter calibration are all standard in the small open economy
in Eichengreen et al. (2006).
18I find two episodes of sudden stops in the Spanish data: one during the Mexico Peso crisis
of 1994 (also known as the Tequila crisis) and the other during the height of the Euro crisis of
2010. Using a panel dataset of 24 emerging economies spanning from 1980-2003, Eichengreen et
al. (2006) find the average frequency of sudden stops to be 5.5%.
19See Mendoza (2006), Martin Gonzalez-Rozada and Andres Neumeyer (2003) and Alan Stock-
man and Linda Tesar (1995)
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DSGE literature: the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is set to be 0.5 with
σ = 2; the share of labor input α is 0.75; and a is set at 0.31 so the share of tradable
consumption is about one third of aggregate consumption.
The model has two sources of exogenous shocks: a tradable endowment yTt and
a country-specific interest rate rt. I assume that shocks (y
T
t , rt) follow a bivariate
AR(1) process. Estimating the AR(1) process using Spain’s annual data from 1980-






















The unconditional standard deviations of ln(yTt ) and rt are 4.93 percent and 3.05
percent respectively.20
I approximate the bivariate AR(1) process using a discrete method. I first
generate the AR(1) process for 50 million consecutive periods using my estimated
coefficients. Then I discretize the (continuous) realized shocks space with three
grid points for yT and three grid points for r.21 Last, I compute the transition
20The tradable GDP is computed as the sum of the value added in the tradable sectors. The
definition tradable sector is standard. The tradable sector includes: industry excluding building
and construction and agriculture, forestry and fishery. The real interest rate time series is computed
as the difference between annualized interest rate on the 10 government bond and the inflation
rate computed from the euro area’s GDP deflator.
21In each dimension, one grid point is at the unconditional mean, a second point is 1.5 un-
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probabilities of going from one state (one combination of grid points) to the other.
I find the discretized (Markov) shock process closely resemble the bivariate AR(1)
process.22
The dynamic stochastic model must be solved using a global method because
of the non-linearities in decision rules and value functions caused by the inequal-
ity constraints—the borrowing constraint and the wage rigidity constraint. The
constrained-optimal allocations are solved using value function iteration while the
laissez-faire allocations are solved using policy function iteration. The value func-
tion and the policy functions are defined over a discrete state-space of four state
variables (w−1, d−1, yT , r). Appendix B provides a detailed description of solution
methods.23
Means and Standard Deviations
To see the dynamic impacts of optimal capital flow management, I simulate
both a laissez-faire economy and the economy with optimal capital flow management
for 1000, 000 periods. The laissez-faire economy is simulated using the laissez-faire
conditional standard deviation above the mean, and a third point is 1.5 unconditional standard
deviation below the mean. There should be 9 states because there are 3 grid points in each di-
mension. However, some state is almost never realized. Therefore, I reduce the 9 states to 7 states
by eliminating the states with the stationary probability smaller than 1%. The states that are
dropped are not the ”Black Swan” events that would have catastrophic or extraordinary impacts
once realized. They are the pairs of a favorable yT (or r) shock combined with an adverse r (or
yT ) shock. Neither the most adverse shocks or the most favorable shocks is dropped.
22I also approximate the bivariate AR(1) process using Tauchen’s method (86) and it produces
similar results.
23The lower and upper bounds of w−1 and d−1 are set so all the simulated w and d are well
above the lower bounds and well below the upper bounds. I use 600 grid points for state variable
d−1, 60 grid points for state variable w−1, and 7 grid points for the shock process (yT , r). More
grid points are allocated to d−1 than w−1 because the non-linearity in value functions and the
policy functions are found to be more severe in d−1.
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decision rules solved in Appendix B.2. The economy with optimal capital flow man-
agement is simulated using the decision rules solved from the constrained planner’s
problem (see Appendix B.1). Table 2.3 reports the simulated means and standard
deviations of some key economic variables.
Table 2.3: Means and Standard Deviations
Laissez-faire Optimal τ
Aggregate Consumption 0.98 (0.04) 0.99 (0.02)
Unemployment Rate (%) 1.96 (4.62) 0.07 (0.64)
Tradable Consumption 0.96 (0.07) 0.96 (0.05)
Real Wage 1.62 (0.11) 1.60 (0.10)
Current Account 0.00 (0.05) 0.00 (0.02)
Trade Balance 0.04 (0.05) 0.04 (0.03)
Outstanding Debt 0.93 (0.05) 0.81 (0.04)
GDP 3.12 (0.22) 3.13 (0.17)
Real Exchange Rate 2.15 (0.15) 2.13 (0.13)
Capital Inflow Tax (%) 0.00 (0.00) 3.63 (2.98)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in the parenthesis. Optimal τ refers to the econ-
omy with optimal capital flow management. Means and standard deviations are computed
using the simulated data.
Table 2.3 shows that optimal capital flow management significantly reduces av-
erage unemployment rate, increases average aggregate consumption, and decreases
the volatilities in both unemployment rate and aggregate consumption. Average
unemployment rate is almost 2 percentage points lower under optimal capital flow
management τ compared to the level in the laissez-faire economy, and average ag-
gregate consumption is 1% higher. The lower average unemployment rate implies
higher average non-tradable consumption, which contributes to the higher aggregate
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consumption under the optimal τ .
Table 2.3 also shows that optimal capital flow management stabilizes capital
flows. The volatility of current account under optimal τ is less than half the level
in laissez-faire economy. The lower volatility in current account is consistent with
the lower volatilities in trade balance and debt. These results are in stark contrast
to the ones found by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2013a). They find optimal capital
flow management to induce higher volatilities in capital flows, tradable balance, and
debt compared to the laissez-faire economy. My results differ from theirs because
of the additional financial friction–the borrowing constraint. Without borrowing
constraint, the planner would encourage a large capital inflow to increase aggre-
gate consumption and reduce unemployment during economic downturns. However,
when households are subject to a borrowing constraint, a large inflow increases the
probability of a binding borrowing constraint in next period and increases financial
stability risk. In other words, the existence of financial stability risk restrains the
planner’s use of current account to boost aggregate demand and reduce unemploy-
ment.
The average optimal capital flow management is an inflow tax of 3.63%, which
lowers average debt level by 3% of GDP. However, τ is not always positive. In par-
ticular, τ is negative—a stimulative inflow subsidy or outflow tax—when unemploy-
ment rate is high. The stimulative inflow subsidy or outflow tax in the simulation
has an average rate of 1.76%, and it happens 12% of the time.24
24When the borrowing constraint binds, τ is zero.
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2.5.2 Correlations with GDP
Table 2.4 reports the simulated correlations between GDP and key economic
variables along with the observed correlations from the Spanish data. Spain can be
characterized as a laissez-faire economy. The simulated correlations of laissez-faire
model are similar to the observed counterparts in the Spanish data. Therefore, the
model accounts for the observed business cycle moments in Spain reasonably well.
Table 2.4: Correlation with GDP
Model Model Data
Laissez-faire Optimal τ Spain
Aggregate Consumption 0.86 0.97 0.92
Unemployment Rate -0.60 -0.21 -0.83
Trade Balance-GDP -0.72 -0.34 -0.77
Current Account-GDP -0.51 0.22 -0.78
Note: Correlations are computed from the simulated data and from the observed Spanish
data respectively.
Table 2.4 reveals that the laissez-faire economy suffers from pro-cyclical unem-
ployment and pro-cyclical capital flows. Optimal capital flow management reduces
these pro-cyclicalities by leaning against wind. The negative correlations between
unemployment and GDP and between current account (as a percent of GDP) and
GDP imply that unemployment rate rises and capital inflows drops during economic
downturns, both of which amplify boom and bust cycle’s fluctuations. Under opti-
mal τ , unemployment becomes less pro-cyclical and it falls by a lesser degree during
economic downturns, and capital inflows become counter-cyclical–inflows increase
49
during economic downturns, both of which help to smooth out boom and bust cy-
cles. These changes are all due to the counter-cyclicality of optimal capital flow
management τ increases when GDP increases, and it decreases when r increases.
The correlation between τ and r is −0.8 (not reported in Table 2.4).
2.5.3 Boom and Bust Cycle
To see how counter-cyclical capital controls stabilize economy over time, Figure
2.6 plots some key economic variables through a typical boom and bust cycle in the
model simulation. The variables plotted are computed by taking the average over
all the boom and bust cycles that satisfy the following criteria: both shocks are at
their mean values in period 0; r is 1.5 standard deviations below its mean in period
8 and 1.5 standard deviations above its mean in period 12; yT is equal to or above
its mean in period 8 and equal to or below its mean in period 12. This definition of
a boom and bust cycle aims to capture a long period of cheap credit followed by a
sudden rise in the cost of borrowing.
Figure 2.6 shows that the cheap credits during boom leads to capital inflows
and a rapid build-up of debt in the laissez-faire economy. The capital inflows fi-
nance an expansion of tradable consumption, which pushes up real wage during a
boom.25 Once the cost of borrowing increases, capital inflows come to a sudden
stop. Households are forced to go through a deleveraging process by cutting back
consumption. The contraction in aggregate demand increases unemployment rate
25Despite of the rising wage, unemployment rate is positive during boom. This is because the
graphs are plotted from the averages of 4000 unique boom and bust cycles. As long as one of the
4000 boom and bust cycles has a boom period with a binding wage rigidity constraint, the average
unemployment would be positive despite the wage rigidity constraint being slack on average.
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Figure 2.6: Boom and Bust Cycle
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Note: The variables in the figure are computed by taking the average over all the boom
and bust cycles that satisfy the following criteria: both shocks are at their mean values
in period 0; r is 1.5 standard deviations below its mean in period 8 and 1.5 standard
deviations above its mean in period 12; yT is equal to or above its mean in period 8 and
equal to or below its mean in period 12.
because wage could not fall fast enough. Moreover, the high real wage set during
boom causes the unemployment rate to rise even further.
Under optimal capital flow management, capital inflows are restricted during
booms, so the level of debt does not increase. Tradable consumption still expands
but by less compared to the laissez-faire economy. As a result, the rise in real wage
is more moderate. When the cost of borrowing increases, the optimal policy leans
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against wind—a stimulative inflow subsidy is introduced to encourage inflows. Un-
like the laissez-faire case, the economy with optimal capital flow management does
not experience a sudden stop in capital inflows because debt is kept relatively low.
As a result, the contraction in consumption is smaller, alleviating unemployment
Figure 2.6 also illustrates the trade-off between macroeconomic and financial
stability. During bust, despite unemployment rate is positive, the planner stops em-
ploying stimulative policy once outstanding debt is above 28% of GDP, and imposes
a prudential tax instead. If the planner had continued with stimulative policy, un-
employment rate would have been even lower, but debt would have risen to a risky
level. So the planner switched from a simulative policy to a prudential one when
financial stability concern dominates unemployment concern.
2.5.4 Frequency and Severity of Sudden Stops
Table 2.5 reports the frequency and severity of sudden stops in the model
simulations. I consider sudden stops because they are the episodes of severe financial
crises. Following the standard definition in literature (see e.g. Bianchi, 2012), a
sudden stop episode is defined as one with a binding borrowing constraint and a
current account reversal that is greater than one standard deviation.
Sudden stops are rare events: they happen 6% of the time in the laissez-faire
economy, and they almost never happen under optimal capital flow management.
Once a sudden stop happens, the cost of welfare is equally high in both laissez-faire
economy and under optimal capital flow management: aggregate consumption drops
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Table 2.5: First Moments During Sudden Stops
Laissez-faire Optimal τ
Sudden Stops Frequency (%) 5.96 0.07
Aggregate Consumption 0.86 0.87
Unemployment Rate (%) 15.15 13.09
Current Account 0.11 0.09
Trade Balance 0.14 0.13
Note: The moments are computed using the simulated data.
by 12%, and unemployment rates increase by 13%. Therefore, most of the welfare
gains from better financial stability under capital flow management comes from the
lower frequency of severe financial crises such as sudden stops.
2.5.5 Unemployment and Binding Borrowing Constraint
Table 2.6 reports the simulated joint probability distributions of unemploy-
ment and the risk of a binding borrowing constraint in the next period. I define
a period to have the risk of a binding borrowing constraint if borrowing constraint
binds when the economy is hit by the worst possible shock in next period. So the
first cell 24.3% means that the laissez-faire economy spends 24.3% of the time in
the states with some unemployment in current period and a positive probability of
binding borrowing constraint in next period. Then one can compute the frequency
of unemployment by summing up the numbers in the first row, and compute the
frequency of having financial stability risk by summing up the numbers in the first
column.
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Full Employment 5.9% 91.5%
Note: Conditional probabilities computed using the simulated data are reported in this
table. A period is defined to have risk of a binding borrowing constraint if the borrowing
constraint binds when the economy is hit by the worst possible shock in subsequent
period, that is Eλ′CC > 0.
Table 2.6 shows that optimal capital flow management significantly reduces
the frequency of unemployment and the frequency of having a positive probability
of binding borrowing constraint in next period. The frequency of unemployment
decreases from 31% in the laissez-faire economy to only 3% under the optimal cap-
ital flow management. In addition, the frequency of having a positive probability
of binding borrowing constraint decreases from 85% to only 8%. Moreover, the
laissez-faire economy spends only 8% of time in the best states of nature—with full
employment and no financial stability risk – and the frequency increases to 91.5%
under the optimal capital flow management.
Table 2.6 also shows that the trade-off between macroeconomic and financial
stability is relevant in the model. The laissez-faire economy spends a quarter of the
time in the states with both financial stability risk and unemployment. In these
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states, an inflow tax reduces financial stability risk at the cost of higher unemploy-
ment.
2.5.6 Decomposition of Optimal Tax
Table 2.7 shows the decomposition of the optimal tax. The means (the first
row in the table) reveal that τ is mostly determined by τAD. The reason is that τFS
and τAD,FS are zero most of the time. τFS is nonzero only when the probability of a
binding borrowing constraint is positive (EλCP
′
CC > 0), which happens about 6.5% of
the time. τFS is nonzero only when the probability of a binding borrowing constraint
together with unemployment is positive (EλCP
′
CC 1h′<h̄ > 0), which happens 5.3% of
the time.
Table 2.7: Optimal Tax and its Components (%)
τ τAD τFS τAD,FS
Mean 3.6 3.1 0.7 -0.2
Min -12.9 -45.8 0.0 -22.2
Max 3.6 9.8 68.8 0.0
Conditional Mean 1.7 -6.3 11.8 -3.8
Note: The moments are computed using the simulated data. The row reports conditional
means when τAD,FS < 0. See Appendix B.3 for detail on how to compute these numbers.
However, during 5.3% of the time when τAD,FS is different from zero, τAD,FS
is twice as large as τ in magnitude, and they have the opposite signs. The last row
reports the conditional means when τAD,FS 6= 0. The conditional means reveal that
the economy is suffering from both insufficient aggregate demand (as indicated by
the large and negative τAD) and severe financial risk (as indicated by the large and
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positive τFS) when τAD,FS 6= 0. Overall, the optimal tax is still positive because
the financial risk concern dominates aggregate demand concern.
The interaction component, τAD,FS, is negative because less deleveraging is
required when there is unemployment in the period of financial crisis. When there is
no unemployment in the period of financial crisis, the real exchange rate depreciation
and hence the debt-deflation process is caused by the decline of c′T only. When
there is unemployment in the period of financial crisis, the real exchange rate still
depreciates because of the decline of c′T , but the real depreciation and hence the
debt-deflation process is alleviated thanks to the decline of c′N . So there is less need
to limit the decline of c′T by reducing debt level with inflow tax. Therefore, the
optimal tax is smaller when the unemployment is larger in the period of financial
crisis, and hence τAD,FS is negative.
2.5.7 Welfare Analysis of Capital Flow Management
Optimal capital flow management requires frequent policy adjustments to
shocks. However, frequent policy changes are unrealistic given political constraints
(see Eichengreen and Rose, 2014). Therefore, I consider two simple capital control
rules. The first (simple rule A) is a flat inflow tax of 4%. The second (simple rule
B) is contingent on unemployment rate: a 4% inflow tax if unemployment rate is
below 2%; and no tax otherwise. The 4% inflow tax rate is the average tax rate
imposed under optimal capital flow management when τ > 0. The flat tax could be
rationalized as a prudential tax aimed to improve financial stability. Simple rule B
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differs from A by taking employment into account.
To quantify the welfare gains of capital flow management, I follow DSGE
literature by computing the percentage increases in permanent consumption when
capital controls are introduced in the laissez-faire economy. Permanent consumption
is defined below as a function of the state variables:
CiPerm(d−1, w−1, yT , r) =
[
(1− β)(1− σ)V i(d−1, w−1, yT , r) + 1
] 1
1−σ
where i denotes regime type, which can be laissez-faire (LF), optimal capital flow
management, simple rule A, or simple rule B. V i(d−1, w−1, yT , r) is the value func-
tion of representative household under regime i. Thus, the percentage increases in
permanent consumption when the capital control τi introduced in the laissez-faire
economy is






Capital flow management leads to significant welfare improvement. Table 2.8
reports the minimum, maximum, and weighted averages of permanent consumption
increase at the non-zero-measure states of laissez-faire economy’s ergodic distri-
bution for different capital control rules. The weighted average is computed by
weighing permanent consumption increase by the ergodic density of each state. The
optimal (state-contingent) capital controls increase permanent consumption by close
to 1% on average. The simple rules are also effective, increasing permanent con-
sumption by 0.5% on average.
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Table 2.8: Welfare Gains of Capital Flow Management
Optimal τ Simple Rule A Simple Rule B
Weighted Average 0.91 0.43 0.53
Minimum 0.66 -0.43 0.13
Maximum 1.31 0.73 0.77
Note: All numbers are in percentage of permanent consumption increase and they are
computed from the simulated data. Welfare improvements are computed using equation
(2.39).
Table 2.8 also shows the importance of taking both macroeconomic and fi-
nancial stability into account. Simple rule B outperforms simple rule A. Moreover,
simple rule A decreases permanent consumption in the worst scenario—the mini-
mum welfare gain is negative. The reason is that simple rule A only takes finan-
cial stability into account: prudential inflow tax increases unemployment during
economic crises, and the loss of higher unemployment exceeds the gains of lower
financial stability risk, so welfare is lower compared to the level in the laissez-faire
economy. On the contrary, simple rule B always increases welfare because it takes
both macroeconomic and financial stability into account.
2.5.8 Sensitivity Analysis
This subsection investigates how sensitive the numerical results presented in
this section are to alternative parameter calibration. In particular, I focus on three
key parameters that affect aggregate demand externality and pecuniary external-
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ity: γ, κ, and ξ. The size of aggregate demand externality is increasing in γ and
decreasing in ξ, and the pecuniary externality is increasing in κ and decreasing in
ξ. Though κ increases the size of pecuniary externality when borrowing constraint
binds, it also makes the borrowing constraint less likely to bind. Therefore, the
overall effect of κ on welfare could be ambiguous.
Recall the baseline model is calibrated to the empirical lower bound of γ and
the empirical upper bound of ξ, so I consider a higher γ of 0.98 and a lower ξ of
0.70 as alternative calibration. In addition, I consider a higher κ of 0.34 so all three
parameter changes would increase the size of externalities. To isolate the impact of
each parameter, I change one parameter at a time and keep the rest unchanged.
Table 3.7 presents the numerical results of alternative parameter calibration.
The average welfare improvement of optimal capital flow management becomes
higher under each alternative calibration compared to the baseline results, all be-
cause of larger externalities as predicted. More specifically, higher γ and lower ξ
increase aggregate demand externality, as evident in the higher and more volatile
unemployment rate in the laissez-faire economy compared to the baseline results. In
addition, higher κ and lower ξ increase the pecuniary externality, so consumption
contraction and unemployment rise in the laissez-faire economy during sudden stops
are 1% higher than those in the baseline results.
Moreover, Table 3.7 shows that average optimal capital inflow tax is higher
and it requires larger adjustments to shocks (higher volatility) when γ is higher and


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter conducts a normative analysis of optimal capital flow manage-
ment in a small open economy with both financial and nominal frictions. The
laissez-faire economy suffers from frequent financial crises and high unemployment
because of the aggregate demand and pecuniary externalities. I show that the size
of the aggregate demand externality is increasing in the wage rigidity parameter
(γ), and decreasing in the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between tradable
and non-tradable goods (ξ). In addition, I show that the pecuniary externality is
increasing in the share of income that can be used to secure debt (κ), and decreasing
in the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable
goods (ξ).
I provide an explicit solution to optimal capital flow management problem in
the form of a tax on international capital inflows. I show that the optimal policy
can be broken down into three components: one corrects the aggregate demand
externality, the second corrects the pecuniary externality, and the third accounts for
the interaction of both externalities. The first component is counter-cyclical: it is a
prudential tax (to restrict capital inflows) when the economy has full employment;
it is a stimulative subsidy (or tax on outflows to restrict capital outflows) when the
economy has unemployment. The second and third components combined represent
a prudential tax when the probability of a binding borrowing constraint is positive.
By calibrating the model to the Spanish economy, I show that capital flow man-
agement could lead to significant welfare improvements in the laissez-faire economy
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by reducing both the frequency of financial crises as well as the level and the volatil-
ity of unemployment rate. In addition, I show that simple inflow tax rules that take
into account both financial and macroeconomic stability could lead to significant
welfare improvements in the laissez-faire economy.
Although this chapter focuses on optimal capital flow management, its results
have implications that are applicable to the design of other financial regulations, for
example capital requirements for banks and loan-to-value ratio or debt-income ratio
on household mortgages. The bulk of the current discussion on financial regula-
tions has focused on their roles in reducing financial stability risk (prudential role).
However, financial regulations could lead to unintended macroeconomic instability
if they only focus on financial stability. I argue that countries could use indepen-
dent and effective monetary policies to correct for these unintended macroeconomic
consequences. However, if the countries do not have independent monetary policies
at their disposal (e.g. the euro area member states) or if they are in a liquidity
trap, then regulators must take into account the impact of financial regulations on
macroeconomics stability when making policies. Therefore, the analyses on the op-
timal capital flow management with dual objectives presented in this chapter could
be relevant and useful for designing other types of financial regulations.
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Chapter 3: Capital Flow Deflection: Multilateral Effects of Capital
Flow Management
3.1 Introduction
What type of multilateral institutions do countries need to govern international
capital flows? As the size and volatility of capital flows, namely to developing
countries, have largely increased in recent years (see Figure 1.1), this question has
raised the interest of both academic economists and policymakers. The ensuing
debate has led the IMF to review its position on the liberalization and management
of capital flows and to provide a set of recommendations to help countries deal with
these flows. Part of this new institutional view is the emphasis on the need for
international agreements to coordinate or set the appropriate standards for policy
intervention. However, as recognized by the IMF, “much further work remains to
be done to improve policy coordination in the financial sector” (IMF, 2012, page
28).
0This chapter is adapted from the paper titled “Capital Flow Deflection” that I co-authored with
Paolo E. Giordani (LUISS “Guido Carli” University), Michele Ruta (the World Bank), and Hans
Weisfeld (the IMF). We would like to thank Tam Bayoumi, Chad Bown, Arnaud Costinot, Martin
Kaufman, Lance Kent, Anton Korinek, David Romer, Kamal Saggi, Sarah Sanya, Robert Staiger
and seminar participants at the University of Maryland, the University of Groningen, George
Mason University, Vanderbilt University, Stanford University, and the International Monetary
Fund for helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the IMF or the World Bank.
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The trade policy literature can be useful to macroeconomists interested in in-
ternational policy coordination. From a methodological point of view, this literature
has shown that multilateral institutions are effective when they provide a framework
to address relevant cross-border spillovers related to countries’ unilateral policies. In
particular, Bagwell and Staiger (1999 and 2002) have shown that the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Trade and Tar-
iffs (GATT), have effectively improved international trade cooperation because they
allow countries to neutralize a relevant trade policy externality, the (intra-temporal)
terms-of-trade effect. Similarly, understanding what are the relevant spillovers as-
sociated with the use of capital flow management is an essential building block to
improving multilateral cooperation in the financial sector.
This chapter reviews the coordination problem among countries that have at
their disposal capital controls as the instrument to manage capital inflows.1 In
the spirit of the trade policy literature, I present a simple framework to identify a
cross-border spillover associated with capital controls and then empirically test the
relevance of this effect. The key insight is that, just like import tariffs can deflect
exports to other markets and may induce a policy response by affected countries
(Bown and Crowley, 2006 and 2007), capital inflow restrictions induce capital flow
deflection and lead to policy response by affected countries.2
1Capital controls encompass a variety of measures, such as taxes, quantitative restrictions and
regulations, that affect cross-border financial activities by discriminating on the basis of residency
(IMF, 2013).
2The term “trade deflection” was introduced in Bown and Crowley (2006) to indicate a situation
where an increase in a trade barrier in one market determines a change in destination in exports.
This is different from the concept of “trade diversion”(Viner, 1950), where the reduction of a
tariff granted to a trading partner increases imports from the latter and reduces imports from
other (potentially more efficient) exporters. An example of trade deflection discussed in Bown and
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Figure 3.1 provides preliminary motivating evidence for the chapter. It shows
the high correlation between the gross capital inflows (as a share of GDP) to South
Africa and the inflow restrictions imposed by Brazil in a period where capital inflow
restrictions in South Africa were essentially stable. Two recent event studies focusing
on Brazil (Forbes et al. 2012; and Lambert et al. 2011) provide further motivating
evidence. In particular, Forbes et al. (2012) find that more stringent capital inflow
restrictions set by Brazil between 2006 and 2011, such as the introduction of a
2 percent tax on portfolio equity and debt inflows in 2009, have led investors to
increase the share of their portfolios allocated to other countries, including Indonesia,
Korea, Peru and Thailand. And interestingly, all these countries have imposed
measures designed to limit capital inflows in 2010-11.3
To examine the problem of policy coordination among recipient countries and
to guide the empirical analysis, I build a parsimonious model based on work by
Korinek (2013). In this setting, governments have two main reasons for influenc-
ing capital flows. A first rationale comes from the desire to manipulate the inter-
temporal terms-of-trade in their favor as discussed in Costinot et al. (2014). A large
country setting capital controls takes into account that its policy choice affects the
world interest rate and finds it unilaterally efficient to exploit this market power.
The second motive for capital controls is to manipulate the domestic interest rate
Crowley (2007) is the steel safeguard, a set of tariffs and quotas, imposed by the US on Chinese
exports in 2002. Shortly afterwards, the EU reacted with similar measures, claiming that the
change in US policy had deflected Chinese steel exports to its market.
3In 2010, Peru increased the fee on non-resident purchase of central bank paper to 400 basis
points (from 10 basis points), while Thailand imposed a 15 percent withholding tax on non-
residents’ interest earnings and capital gains on state bonds. In 2011, Indonesia introduced a limit
on short-term foreign borrowing by banks to 30 percent of capital and Korea restored a 14 percent
withholding tax on interest income on non-resident purchases of treasury bonds (IMF, 2013).
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Note: The left vertical axis provides the scale for gross inflows as share of GDP. The right
vertical axis provides the scale for inflow restrictions as measured by Schindler (2009).
to address domestic distortions, such as financial fragility.4 I refer to the latter as
the prudential motive (as it is often called in the literature), while the first is the
terms-of-trade motive. Note that this model is simple and does not account for the
aggregate demand externality introduced in the last chapter because the goal of the
model is to illustrate the potential spillover effects, which the current set-up suffices.
In this context, I formally investigate the causes and consequences of capital
flow deflection. Inflow restrictions imposed by a large country, or a sufficiently
large set of small countries, lower world interest rate, as they subtract demand for
4In the words of Keynes (1943), “the whole management of the domestic economy depends
upon being free to have the appropriate rate of interest without reference to the rates prevailing
elsewhere in the world. Capital control is a corollary to this.”
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capital from the world market. This change in the world interest rate leads to higher
borrowing by recipient countries that have not altered their capital controls. The
cross-border policy spillover effect among borrowers is what I refer to as capital flow
deflection. It is insightful to look at this effect of capital controls from the perspective
of foreign investors. For them all borrowing countries are identical (by assumption),
except for capital controls. As international investors perceive a lower return of
exporting capital to countries that tightened capital controls, they reallocate their
capital to the other borrowers. This insight plays an important role in my empirical
strategy.
Capital flow deflection, in turn, induces a policy response by borrowers. Im-
portantly, while the spillover effect is independent of the underlying rationale for
capital controls, this is not the case for the policy response. Specifically, capital
flow deflection has an ambiguous impact on the terms-of-trade motive for capital
controls. Intuitively, the incentive to manipulate the international interest rate with
capital controls depends on the elasticity of global savings faced by the country. On
the other hand, the prudential motive for capital controls is strengthened by capital
flow deflection. The higher inflows exacerbate domestic distortions and increase the
incentive to manipulate the domestic interest rate with capital controls to offset
them. This result has an interesting corollary. If the primary motive for capital
controls is to manipulate the domestic interest rate, as for prudential controls, then
uncoordinated inflow restrictions can magnify exogenous shocks, such as a sudden
increase in global liquidity. Intuitively, with capital flow deflection, inflow restric-
tions are complementary policies, so that a shock initiates a chain reaction and leads
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to a multiplier effect.5
In my empirical investigation, I use a dynamic panel model to estimate the
impact of capital controls on inflows to other countries and on the policy response.
To my knowledge, this is the work first that investigates these issues in a cross-
sectional study. There is a well known literature on the push and pull factors that
determine capital flows (e.g. Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Ghosh et al. 2013), but
these studies generally abstract from the role of capital controls by third countries.
Two exceptions, as discussed above, are the event study approach by Forbes et
al. (2012) and Lambert et al. (2011) that find evidence of capital flow deflection
spurring from the policies implemented in Brazil between 2006 and 2011. Finally,
a small recent literature examines the factors that cause policymakers to change
capital controls (Fratzscher, 2012; Fernandez et al. 2013). These studies, however,
disregard the policy response to the capital controls imposed by other borrowers.
I use data on gross capital inflows for a large sample of developing countries
between 1995 and 2009 and use the so called Schindler index (Schindler, 2009) which
allows us to identify the capital controls aiming at restricting inflows. To test the
model, I divide countries into groups of likely substitutes based on common char-
acteristics, such as geographic location, export specialization, return and risk. This
is an important step, as the model features symmetric countries and, therefore, ab-
stracts from the multiple features of cross-country heterogeneity that may influence
investors’ decisions in practice. In the first set of regressions, I introduce a variable
5Similar arguments have been informally made by others. In particular, Ostry et al. (2012)
and Korinek (2013) talk of the possibility of a “capital control arms race” .
68
capturing the level of capital controls in the rest of group in an otherwise standard
push-pull analysis. In the second set of regressions, I use a probit model to estimate
the probability that capital controls by some countries may trigger a reaction in a
country of the same group.
I find strong evidence of a capital flow deflection. The spillover effect of inflow
restrictions is estimated to be strong and significant among countries that have
similar risk level. Perhaps surprisingly, I find no significant spillover effects on
countries in the same region. This finding is consistent with the view that investors
are guided by the common economic characteristics of countries, rather than their
geographic location—a result that confirms in a cross-section the evidence of existing
event studies. Capital flow deflection is also found to be economically relevant.
While somehow an extreme case, we estimate that gross inflows to South Africa as
a share of GDP would have been between 0.5 and 1.0 percent lower if Brazil had
not imposed higher inflow restrictions in 2009. Finally, these results are robust to a
number of tests. In particular, spillovers to countries with similar risk levels continue
to be significant when I use different measures of capital controls or risk, when I
focus on episodes of capital flow surges and when I use an instrumental variable
(IV) approach to address endogeneity problems.
Notwithstanding the strength of capital flow deflection, I find no evidence of
a policy response. This result is independent of how I group countries and persists
even if I focus on small economies, which have no terms-of-trade motives to set
capital controls. I see two possible explanations for this somewhat puzzling result.
The first has to do with the nature of the data on capital controls. The Schindler
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index, as the other available measures of capital controls, do not record a change
in intensity of a measure (say, an increase in the tax on capital inflows from 2% to
4%), but only whether the measure is in place or not. To the extent that countries
react to capital flow deflection by toughening existing policies rather than creating
new ones, the empirical findings would be biased against a policy response.
The second reason has to do with the model I use to guide empirical analysis.
As discussed in a large literature following the seminal work of Bartolini and Drazen
(1997), capital controls can work as a signal to markets in presence of uncertainty
over the government type. If policymakers anticipate this, they may be more reluc-
tant to use capital controls in short run in fear that investors will interpret them
as a change in the course of future policies.6 In this case, a policy response can be
muted even in presence of capital flow deflection.
Finally, a third explanation is that prudential controls are less relevant in prac-
tice than theory seems to suggest. This may be either because governments resort
to instruments other than inflow restrictions to deal with capital flow deflection or
because there are situations where this deflection can have a positive impact, such
as when countries have difficulties accessing international financial markets.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a simple
general equilibrium model of capital flows and establishes the two main results on
capital flow deflection. Section 3 brings these two predictions to data. I first provide
6Some may see this argument as contradicting the notion that capital controls can be a legit-
imate (even if second-best) instrument to address a domestic distortion. This idea, however, has
only recently become widely accepted (for instance, the institutional view of the IMF on capital
flow management was published in 2012), while my dataset covers the period of 1995-2009. An
interesting question is, therefore, whether in the future a policy response to capital flow deflection
will become a more permanent feature of the international financial system.
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evidence of the cross-border spillover effect of capital controls and then I focus on the
policy reaction to inflow restrictions. Concluding remarks and policy implications
are in Section 4.
3.2 A Two-Period Model of Capital Controls
In this section I introduce the simplest model of international capital flows. I
assume a multi-country world lasting two periods (t = 1, 2) where economic agents
face a standard inter-temporal consumption decision problem. There is a single ho-
mogeneous good that is tradable across boarders. Consumers could shift consump-
tion across two periods using an intentional bond that is denominated in tradable
goods. Each country can introduce capital controls to affect consumers’ decisions.
The model is a further simplified version of the framework presented in Korinek
(2013). Even this, admittedly highly stylized, theoretical framework is sufficient to
identify the two effects that I am interested in, and that are investigated empirically
in Section 3: (i) the capital flow deflection, whereby a country raising its capital
controls leads to higher capital inflows to other countries; (ii) the policy response,
whereby a country alters its capital controls in response to a change in controls by
other borrowers. I start by introducing the characteristics of a generic country i.
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3.2.1 Economic Structure of Country i
Country i is populated by a unit mass of identical consumers who earn yit at








1 − Y i1 ), (3.1)
with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0 and βi < 1. Ci1 and Y
i
1 denote, respectively, aggregate consump-
tion and income in country i in the first period, both of which are taken as given by
individual agents. Therefore, Ci1 − Y i1 measures the current account deficit of coun-
try i in the first period, which also equals to the country’s capital inflows (outflows)
if Ci1− Y i1 is positive (negative). Function e(·) captures the fact that capital inflows
may be associated with negative external effects, such as the risk that results from
domestic households ignoring the consequences of their foreign borrowing decisions
on the country’s financial stability (financial fragility). Specifically, this externality
is defined as
e(Ci1 − Y i1 ) ≡

−x(Ci1 − Y i1 ) when Ci1 − Y i1 > 0
0 when Ci1 − Y i1 ≤ 0,
where x(·) is a positive twice continuously differentiable function with x′(·), x′′(·) >
0.7 If a country is a lender (Ci1−Y i1 ≤ 0), the externality is null. If instead a country
is a borrower (Ci1 − Y i1 > 0), the externality associated with capital inflows enters
7The convexity of the externality function is a common assumption in the literature. In the
context of financial fragility, convexity is justified by the fact that the risk to a country’s financial
stability is likely to increase at a faster rate as foreign debt rises.
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individual welfare function.
Consumers must satisfy the following inter-temporal budget constraint:
(ci1 − yi1)(1 + τ i)R = yi2 − ci2 + T i, (3.2)
where R ≡ 1 + r is the world gross real interest rate, and τ i is a tax/subsidy on
individual borrowing at time 1. In the context of a representative agent economy,
τ i can also be interpreted as the capital control policy at time 1. A positive τ i
denotes a capital inflow tax (outflow subsidy) and a negative τ i denotes a capital
inflow subsidy (outflow tax) if the country is a borrower (lender). For the rest of the
chapter, I simply refer to τ i as capital controls. Tax revenue (or the cost of subsidy)
is assumed to be rebated to (or financed from) consumers in lump-sum, so that
T i = (ci1 − yi1)τ iR. (3.3)
In each country i, the representative consumer maximizes her objective func-
tion (3.1) while satisfying the budget constraint (3.2), and taking the world interest
rate R, the policy τ i as well as aggregate variables as given. Maximization gives rise












τ i). Assuming substitution effect
dominates income effect, a higher interest rate implies higher savings (ci1 ↓, ci2 ↑),
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and hence a fall in the demand of capital in borrowing countries and a surge in the
supply of capital from lending countries. On the other hand, a country i that raises
its capital controls (τ i ↑) creates a wedge between world interest rate and domestic
interest rate (Ri = R(1 + τ i)), thus stimulating domestic savings (ci1 ↓, ci2 ↑) and,
hence, reducing its demand of capital.
Substitute (3.3) into (3.2) yields the resource constraint of country i:




3.2.2 Competitive World Market Equilibrium
Assume a world economy made up of n countries, I now characterize the




i = 1. Hence, mi = 0 implies that country i is small with respect to




mi[yi1 − ci1(R, τ i)] = 0. (3.6)
The competitive world market equilibrium is a configuration in which agents
maximize their utility and international capital market clears. Specifically,
Definition 6 (Competitive World Market Equilibrium) Given {yi1, yi2, βi,mi, τ i}ni=1,
a world competitive market equilibrium consists of gross real world interest rate R∗
and each country’s consumption plan {ci∗1 , ci∗2 }ni=1 that satisfy (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6).
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3.2.3 Capital Flow Deflection
In this subsection, we analyze the cross-border spillovers associated with cap-
ital controls. In particular, I carry out a comparative statics exercise to analyze the
effects of a change in capital controls in a set of countries on world interest rate, as
well as its impact on capital flows to the rest of the world.





lowers the equilibrium world interest rate.



































Lemma 1 is instrumental to prove the propositions on the multilateral effects
of capital controls. The first of these effects is capital flow deflection, which is the
spillover effect of more stringent controls in one (or more) countries on the amount
of capital inflows accruing to other countries. This effect is studied below
Proposition 5 (Capital Flow Deflection) A rise in capital controls in a non-
negligible set of countries S causes an increase in capital inflows to the other coun-
tries.
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< 0. Therefore, the net capital inflows ci1 − yi1 must also
increase for all i /∈ S.
Proposition 5 should come at no surprise as it simply states that, when a
country raises its barriers to capital inflows, it deflects part of these flows to other
countries. The existence of this cross-country spillover effect of capital controls will
be verified empirically in the second part of this chapter.
3.2.4 Optimal Capital Controls
So far, I have taken capital controls as given. Now let’s consider what happens
when capital controls become endogenous. Country i’s national planner maximizes








1 − yi1), (3.7)
subject to the budget constraint (3.5).
The crucial difference between the individual’s and the social planner’s opti-
mization problem is that the latter internalizes the aggregate impact of individual
consumption plans on capital inflows to country i. The socially optimal consumption
plans for country i are implicitly determined by the following Euler equation:





A comparison of the two Euler equations (3.4) and (3.8) shows that there are
two reasons for policy intervention in this economy. A first reason results from the
presence of a domestic externality. The government may restrict capital inflows as
a means to manipulate the domestic interest rate (Ri = R(1 + τ i)), thus affecting
agents’ saving patterns and offsetting this distortion. I follow the literature on
financial fragility and refer to this rationale as the prudential motive for capital
controls. While not explicitly modeled here, other non-prudential motives commonly
discussed in the literature (e.g. targeting the real exchange rate or dealing with the
“trilemma”) can also fit into this category. As prudential controls, they aim at
correcting the domestic interest rate rather than manipulating the international
one.
While the first motive of capital control improves domestic inefficiency by
correcting pecuniary externality, the second motive leads to global inefficiency by
exploiting a country’s market power. The second motive of capital control arises
whenever country i is large enough to affect the world interest rate (mi > 0). It
is well known in the literature that large countries attempt to exploit their market
power by taking advantage of the effect that their policy has on world interest rate
(inter-temporal terms-of-trade effect). For instance, a country exploits its monop-
sonistic power in capital market by taxing capital inflows so as to limit domestic
demand and thus keep a “low” cost of capital. In solving the optimization problem
defined above, the national planner of country i knows that R depends on its own
domestic capital demand mi(ci1 − yi1) through the market-clearing condition for the
world economy (3.6). In the rest of the chapter, I refer to this second rationale for
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imposing capital controls as the terms-of-trade motive.8
I am now ready to characterize the optimal capital control for country i.
Lemma 2 (Unilaterally Optimal Capital Controls) The unilateral optimal pol-
icy (τ i∗) can be decomposed into a prudential motive (τ̂ i) and a terms-of-trade motive
(τ̃ i), such that






when ci1 − yi1 > 0
0 when ci1 − yi1 ≤ 0
. (3.10)
and
τ̃ i = mi · ε−i, (3.11)
where ε−i is the inverse elasticity of global savings faced by country i, and it is








Proof See Appendix A.4.
Capital controls can be imposed for prudential or terms-of-trade reasons or
both. Expression (3.10) captures country i’s optimal prudential controls. They are
null whenever i is a lender. In fact, since the externality is null, the solution to the
8As the above discussion highlights, in this standard macro framework, we could define national




; that is, directly in terms of the local and world interest rates that capital
control selections imply. This general formulation is equivalent to the one used in the trade policy
coordination literature (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999 and 2002), where the governments’ objectives
are a function of the local and world prices implied by tariff selection.
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welfare maximization for a rational forward-looking national planner coincides with
the utility maximization of the representative consumer, and optimal prudential
policy is no-intervention: τ̂ i = 0. Capital controls are instead strictly positive when
country i is a borrower. In particular, the expression x′(ci1 − yi1)/[u′(ci1) − x′(ci1 −
yi1)] implies that the intensity of capital control should increase in the severity of
externality and decrease in the level of aggregate consumption.
Expression (3.11) is the well known formula for the unilaterally optimal tax
of a country that exploits its market power. A borrowing country faces a positive
elasticity (ε−i > 0), and hence taxes capital inflows (τ̃ i > 0). In particular, a more
rigid supply of capital from the rest of the world (that is, a higher ε−i) commands
stronger controls on capital inflows (that is, a higher τ̃ i). On the other hand, a
lending country faces a negative elasticity (ε−i < 0), and hence taxes capital outflows
(τ̃ i < 0). Moreover, a more rigid demand of capital from the rest of the world (that
is, a lower ε−i) implies stronger controls on capital outflows (that is, a lower τ̃ i ).
3.2.5 Capital Controls’ Response
I now introduce the policy response of countries to capital controls imposed
by the others. I show that the nature of this policy response depends on the motive
(prudential or terms-of-trade) for capital controls. My findings are summarized
below
Proposition 6 (Policy Response) A rise in the capital controls in the set of
countries S−i (τS








(1 + τ̃ i) +
dτ̃ i
dτS−i






















Proof See Appendix A.5.
I have isolated two and possibly opposing forces that govern the relationship
of capital control policies among countries. The presence of a capital inflows’ nega-
tive externality makes the policies complementary, while the exploitation of market
power by large countries may or may not act in the same direction depending on
the impact of capital controls on the elasticity of global savings.
This result can be rationalized as follows. A rise in capital controls in a set
of countries (or just in a single large country) lowers the equilibrium interest rate
(Lemma 1) and raises capital inflows to country i (Proposition 5). This exacerbates
the negative domestic externality and thus leads country i to “defend itself” from
an excessive capital inflow by raising its own capital controls for prudential reasons
(dτ̂ i/dR < 0). If country i is small, its reaction to an increase of capital controls in
other countries is unambiguous: it responds by raising its own barriers.
If country i is large, instead, the nature of the relationship among capital
controls—namely whether capital controls are complements or substitutes - also
depends on the sign of dτ̃ i/dτS
−i
, which in turn depends on how the (inverse of the)
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elasticity of global savings faced by country i (ε−i) responds to changes in the capital
controls of the countries involved. In fact, in deciding its optimal policy response, a
large country i takes into account, not only the effect of countries S−i’s policies but
also the one of its own policy on elasticity ε−i. In the proof of Proposition 6, I show
that both effects are ambiguous and ultimately rest on the preference fundamentals
of consumers. In particular, I show that the complementarity or substitutability of
the terms-of-trade driven capital controls depend on whether these controls become
more or less effective in affecting world interest rate as they increase.9
The proposition shows how prudential controls (and, more broadly, any in-
flow restrictions aiming at manipulating domestic interest rate) respond to exoge-
nous shocks. Taken together, Lemma 1 and Proposition 6 delineate a complemen-
tary relationship between world interest rate and prudential capital control policies,
whereby a lower interest rate leads to more restrictions on capital inflows, and vice
versa. Such complementarity may amplify the effects of exogenous shocks to the
world economy or to any subset S of it, thus giving rise to what is usually called a
multiplier effect. More formally, denote by τ̂ i(R∗, ρ) the optimal prudential policy
function for country i ∈ S, and where parameter ρ captures any feature that affects
τ̂ i other than changes in R∗ (such as the endowments yit, or the discount factor β
i).
I am now ready to formulate the following:
9This is not surprising: by definition, optimal terms-of-trade driven controls for country i
are stronger, the greater the sensitivity of world interest rate to the supply of capital faced by
country i (dR/d(y−i1 − c
−i
1 )). As a result, if an increase in τ
S−i implies an ever greater impact
of capital inflows on the world interest rate (d2R/d(y−i1 − c
−i
1 )
2 · d(y−i1 − c
−i
1 )/dτ
S−i > 0), then,
other things equal, country i is more likely to respond to such increase by raising its own policy,





Corollary 1 (Multiplier Effect) A shock to any subset of countries S causes a
prudential policy response of each country i ∈ S which can be decomposed into
∣∣∣∣∣dτ̂ idρ
∣∣∣∣∣ =




A multiplier effect characterizes the prudential capital control policy of each country




The complementary relationship between τ̂ i and R∗ that gives rise to the
multiplier effect is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.2. To gain an intuition of
this corollary, suppose a non-negligible fraction of borrowing countries are hit by
an exogenous shock (ρ ↑) that induces them to raise their restrictions on capital
inflows, say from point E to E ′ in Figure 3.2. This rise in capital controls lowers
world interest rate (Lemma 1 1), which moves from E ′ to E ′′. Each country, however,
reacts to a lower R by further increasing its optimal capital controls from E ′′ to E ′′′,
which in turn triggers a further decrease in world interest rate, and so on and so
forth. As a result of this chain reaction, the aggregate policy response to the shock,
as measured by the horizontal distance between point E and point F , exceeds the
initial capital controls imposed by each individual borrowing country, as measured
by the length EE ′.
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Figure 3.2: The Multiplier Effect in Capital Controls
3.3 Do Capital Controls Deflect Capital Flows and Lead to a Policy
Response?
The previous section shows the existence of a spillover effect of capital controls
on other countries and of a policy response (Propositions 5 and 6). In this section,
I investigate their empirical relevance. In particular, I use a dynamic panel and
push-pull factors model to study the impact of inflow controls on gross inflows to
other countries and the impact of inflow controls on capital controls imposed by
other countries.
The recent empirical literature on capital flows differentiates between gross
and net flows (Forbes and Warnock, 2012). Gross inflows are the net of foreign
purchases of domestic assets and foreign sales of domestic assets. In other words,
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gross inflows measure the change in the stock of gross foreign liability before any
valuation adjustment. Gross outflows measure the change in the stock of foreign
assets before any valuation adjustment. Net flows are the difference between the
two.
Capital controls can target either gross inflows or gross outflows. Inflow con-
trols target gross inflows: these are restrictions imposed on foreign purchases of
domestic assets and/or foreign sales of domestic assets. Inflow controls could be
imposed either on the foreigner who trades the domestic assets with a domestic
counterpart or on the domestic resident who trades the domestic assets with a for-
eign counterpart. On the other hand, outflow controls target gross outflows: these
are restrictions imposed on domestic residents’ purchases of foreign assets or domes-
tic residents’ sales of foreign assets. Such restrictions could be imposed either on the
domestic resident who trades foreign assets with a foreign counterpart or foreigner
who trades foreign assets with a domestic counterpart. Both inflow and outflow
controls have in common that they discriminate on the basis of residency. In this
respect, they differ from the broader set of capital flow management measures and
from other (non-discriminatory) prudential measures (IMF, 2013).
In order to precisely test the theory in Section 2, I focus on a measure of
inflow controls (rather than generic capital controls, which also include restrictions
on capital outflows) and on gross inflows instead of net flows, because the latter
include the gross outflow component. My empirical investigation has two parts.
First, I examine the impact of inflow controls imposed by other countries on one’s
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gross inflows (capital flow deflection).10 Second, I examine the impact of inflow
controls imposed by other countries on one’s inflow controls (policy response).
3.3.1 Data
My sample consists of 78 less industrialized countries and emerging markets
(see Table 3.1 for a complete list). I focus on developing countries as they are more
likely to employ capital controls than more advanced countries which are blessed
with a wider set of policy instruments to address domestic distortions.11 The sample
period spans 15 years from 1995-2009 and the data are in annual frequency. A
country is included in my sample only if it has at least ten years of observations for
all variables used in the regression models. While sample period, data frequency,
and the selection of countries are all inevitably constrained by data availability, the
panel covers several interesting episodes including the crises in Asia in the 1990s and
in South America in the early 2000s and the first two years of the Great Recession,
2007-2009.
I use Schindler’s (2009) index of capital controls, which is a de jure mea-
sure constructed from information contained in the Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) provided by the IMF.12 The
10Obviously, capital controls can have more than one spillover effect. Gross outflows are directly
affected by inflow controls in recipient countries as one’s outflow is another’s inflow. Following the
terminology in the trade literature, I can refer to this spillover effect as capital flow depression,
which differs from the capital flow deflection analyzed here.
11There are 443 instances of changes in inflow controls from 1995-2009 among developing coun-
tries, while the number is 69 among more advanced economies during the same period. The average
inflow restriction index for the period is 0.5 among developing countries, while it is only 0.2 among
more advanced countries.
12Schindler’s (2009) dataset consists of 56 developing countries from 1995-2005. I use a dataset
consisting of 124 developing countries from 1995-2009 built using Schindler’s method (see Appendix
85
Table 3.1: Country List by Risk
High Risk High-Moderate Low-Moderate Low Risk
Risk Risk
Angola Albania Argentina Bahamas, The
Burkina Faso Algeria Azerbaijan Bahrain
Republic of Congo Armenia Bolivia Botswana
Cote d’Ivoire Bangladesh Brazil Chile
Dem. Rep. of the Congo Belarus Bulgaria China
Ethiopia Cameroon Dominican Republic Costa Rica
Guinea Colombia Egypt Croatia
Guinea-Bissau Ecuador El Salvador Hungary
Haiti Ghana Gabon Jordan
Iraq Guyana Guatemala Kuwait
Lebanon Honduras India Latvia
Liberia Indonesia Iran Libya
Malawi Kenya Jamaica Lithuania
Mozambique Madagascar Kazakhstan Malaysia
Myanmar Mali Papua New Guinea Mexico
Nicaragua Moldova Paraguay Morocco
Niger Mongolia Peru Namibia
Nigeria Romania Philippines Oman
Pakistan Senegal Russia Panama
Sierra Leone Sri Lanka South Africa Poland
Sudan Suriname Syria Qatar
Togo Tanzania Thailand Saudi Arabia
Turkey Uganda Ukraine Trinidad and Tobago
Zambia Venezuela Uruguay Tunisia
Zimbabwe Yemen Vietnam United Arab Emirates
Note: Time-invariant groups by composite risk. The countries in bold are used in the
regression analysis. All the countries listed are used in computing τS
−i
.
main advantage of this index relative to others commonly used in the literature such
as Chinn and Ito (2006) is that the Schindler index distinguishes between controls
on capital inflows and outflows. In particular, Schindler’s index calculates inflow
controls as the average of the restriction dummies on the following series of interna-
tional transactions: purchase of financial assets locally by nonresidents, sale or issue
of financial assets abroad by residents, collective investment by nonresidents to res-
idents, financial credits by nonresidents to residents, inward direct investment, and
C). I would like to thank colleagues at the IMF for sharing the expanded dataset.
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liquidation of direction investment.13 The index varies between 0 (i.e. no restriction)
and 1 (i.e. restrictions on all international transactions).
The data on capital controls are depicted in Figure 3.3. Panel A plots the
inflow controls by regions, with higher numbers indicating more stringent restric-
tions.14 There are noticeable differences as well as some common trends across
regions. Asian and former Soviet bloc countries are more likely to have higher
inflow restrictions than Latin American and central and east European countries.
Countries across all regions tightened inflow controls during the Asian financial cri-
sis, and the high level persisted in most regions except for central and east European
countries that were going through capital account liberations in preparation for EU
membership. During the 2007 financial crisis, most regions tightened inflow controls
except for countries of the former Soviet bloc whose restrictions were nevertheless
very stringent compared to other regions except for Asia.
Figure 3.3 also depicts inflow restrictions when I group countries by economic
characteristics rather than geographic location. Specifically, we focus on export
specialization (Panel B), growth rate (Panel C) and composite risk (Panel D). By
dividing countries into groups, I aim at capturing characteristics that render them
close substitutes from the perspective of international investors. In this regard,
the natural way to group countries together is based on the similarity of risk and
return, as they are the two main determinants of investment decisions. Forbes et
13Financial assets are shares or other securities of a participating nature, bonds or other debt
securities, other market instruments. A more detailed description of the index and its methodology
are available in Appendix C.
14I follow the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) and divide countries into six regional
groups: Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Sahara Africa, Former Soviet Bloc,
and Central and East Europe.
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A. Country Groups by Regions B. Country Groups by Export Specialization 
C. Country Groups by Growth Rate D. Country Groups by Composite Risk Level 
Note: Schindler’s index of inflow controls is on the vertical axis. 1 indicates full restriction,
0 indicates no restriction. Year is on the horizontal axis. Group averages are used to plot
the graphs in each panel.
al. (2012) find that countries exporting to China are affected by Brazil’s capital
inflow restrictions. Since these countries are mostly commodity exporters, I also
consider export specialization as a relevant country grouping.15 Just like geographic
location, groups by economic characteristics also display some interesting common
patterns. In particular, countries with lower composite risk tend to display more
stable and lower capital controls relative to riskier countries. Primary goods and
15For export specialization I continue to follow the WEO classification and divide countries into
five groups: fuel exporters, primary goods exporters, manufacturing exporters, service exporters,
and diversified exporters.
88
service exporters tend to have lower inflow restrictions than fuel, manufacturing and
diversified exporters. Finally, no clear pattern emerges when I group countries by
growth rate.
Following Forbes and Warnock (2012) I compute gross capital inflows as the
sum of net portfolio investment liabilities, other liabilities, and net foreign direct
investment. All components of gross capital inflows are available from the IMF’s In-
ternational Financial Statistics (IFS) database as reported in BPM5 format.16 Table
3.2 shows summary statistics of inflow controls, gross inflows, and other variables
used in the regression analysis. Table D.1 reports the data sources. Note that I
have two measures that capture the risk of investing in a country: composite risk
and law and order. Higher values indicate lower risk. The composite risk index is
a measure of a country’s combined economic, financial, institutional, and political
risks, while law and order index captures mainly the institutional risk of a country.
For this reason, I focus on the composite risk index as the proxy for country risk in
my main regressions. The other measures of country risk are used in the robustness
analysis. The other variables in the spillover analysis are standard taken from the
push-pull factor literature. I use real US interest rate as a proxy for world real
interest. This is computed from annualized US three month treasury rate adjusted
by US inflation. The VIX index is used as a proxy for global volatility. Inflation
and other country specific variables come from the WEO, while I use Ilzetzki et al.
(2010) for exchange rate regime classifications.
16Some components of gross inflows have value 0 in some countries, but our data source does
not specify whether these are really zero or missing information. In the regression analysis, I try
both interpretations and they lead to the same findings. Below, I report the results where gross
capital flows are computed by treating a 0 observation as no capital inflows.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
Schindler index (inflows restrictions) 1170 0.49 0.34 0.00 1.00
Gross inflows (% GDP) 1108 4.84 8.08 -38.99 63.85
VIX 1170 21.54 6.45 12.58 34.04
Real US interest rate 1170 0.94 1.63 -2.36 3.18
Inflation 1135 15.01 54.01 -9.86 1061.21
Real GDP growth rate 1169 4.12 4.72 -24.79 62.19
Nominal GDP per capita in USD (logged) 1159 7.42 1.17 4.38 10.66
Nominal GDP in USD (logged) 1170 10.10 1.70 6.47 15.42
Real effective exchange rate 1170 106.78 33.93 56.09 597.37
Composite risk 1138 66.24 8.72 28.00 86.70
Law and order 1138 3.38 1.14 1.00 6.00
de facto exchange rate regime 1134 2.17 1.15 1.00 6.00
Table 3.3: Data Sources
Data Source
Capital flows International Financial Statistics (IFS)
Capital controls Schindler (2009)
VIX Yahoo Finance
US three month treasury rate Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)
Inflation rate World Economic Outlook (WEO)
Real GDP growth rate WEO
Nominal GDP per capita in US$ WEO
Nominal GDP in US$ WEO
Real Effective Exchange Rate Information Notice System (INS)
Composite risk index Political Risk Service (PRS)
Law and Order PRS
de facto Exchange rate regime classification Reinhart et al. (2008)
Election Year Database of Political Institutions (DPI)
Political Orientation of the Ruling Party DPI
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3.3.2 Evidence of Capital Flow Deflection
In this subsection, I present evidence that capital controls deflect capital flows
to other countries. I first present the empirical strategy, which extends the standard
push-pull factor model to account for spillover effects. Then I present the regression
results for the entire sample of developing economies and for groups of countries
that are likely substitutes from the perspective of international investors. Finally,
we undertake a series of robustness tests.
Empirical Strategy
I follow closely the empirical literature on the determinants of capital flows
(e.g. Ghosh et al. 2012, Forbes and Warnock, 2012) and use a standard pull-
push model with an additional variable that captures the spillover effect of inflow
restrictions.17 Specifically, the regression equation is









where ωit denotes country i’s gross capital inflow as a percentage of GDP at time t
(henceforth, subscript t denotes time and i denotes country i.d.), Rt is real world
interest rate, τ it−1 denotes country i’s capital inflow controls (lagged once), τ
S−i
t
denotes the (weighted average of the) inflow restrictions of all countries in the set
17See Magud et al. (2012) for a survey of the literature.
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ȳj being the sample-period-average of country j’s real GDP, x
i
t is a vector of the
rest of pull-push factors that determine ωit commonly used in the literature, and u
i
t
is the error term.
The model in Section 2 predicts that β1 and β2 are negative as households
reduce current consumption by borrowing less when world real interest rate goes
up or when inflow restrictions tighten, so that the domestic interest rate increases
vis-a-vis the world interest rate. Differently from previous studies, I also include
τS
−i
t as an explanatory variable since capital controls in the set of countries S
−i can
deflect capital flows to country i. β3 captures this spillover effect, and the model
predicts it to be positive. The rest of the standard pull-push factors include global
volatility, real GDP growth rate, real GDP growth rate shock, real GDP per capita,
and country risk.18 I lag all the domestic pull factors as well as domestic inflow
controls to reduce endogeneity problems. Global push factors and the rest of the
world’s capital inflow controls are contemporaneous as they are less likely to suffer
from endogeneity with the dependent variable. The expected signs of explanatory
variables are reported in the last column of the regression tables for convenience.
18The real GDP growth rate shock is the log difference between real GDP growth rate and its
H-P filtered trend. The country risk is included because Alfaro et al. (2008) show that institutional
quality plays an important role in determining capital flows. In the regressions, I also introduce
additional controls used in the literature of push and pull factors. They include: domestic inflation,
real effective exchange rate overvaluation, de facto exchange rate regime. The findings discussed
below are robust to the inclusion of these additional variables. However, I do not include them in
the baseline regressions because their coefficients are never significant.
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Benchmark Regression
Table 3.4 shows the OLS estimation results of equation (3.12) for the entire
sample (i.e. when S = Ω). For expositional clarity, variables are divided into
three blocks: global push variables that only vary across time and are invariant
across countries; domestic pull factors that vary across both time and countries;
and the spillover variable –the rest of world’s capital inflow control—which also
varies both across time and countries. Column (1) reports the OLS coefficients for
equation (3.12). To reduce possible omitted variable bias, column (2) reports the
OLS coefficients when year fixed effects are included. Since global push factors only
vary over time but do not vary across countries, they drop out in the specification
with year fixed effects.
Both specifications are able to explain more than 10% of the variation in gross
capital inflows. Most variables are significant determinants of gross capital inflows
and their coefficients have the expected signs.19 Country’s own capital control is
insignificant once country fixed effects are introduced, but it is significant with
expected sign when country fixed effects are not included (not reported). The reason
is that many countries do not change capital controls frequently.20 The key variable
19A priori, it is not obvious what sign the coefficient on real GDP per capita should have. On
the one hand, higher real GDP per capita is associated with higher level of financial development,
which should lead to more inflows. On the other hand, lower real GDP per capital is also associated
with weak economic infrastructure and financial capacity, which implies more need for foreign
investment and capital inflows. Previous studies find mixed results. Ghosh et al. (2012) find
real GDP per capita to reduce the probability of experiencing a net flow surge, while Forbes and
Warnock (2012) find no evidence that real GDP per capita is associated with gross inflow surge.
20When I rerun the regressions using different measure of capital controls, I find own control to be
significant with the expected sign in most cases (see Table 3.7). The difference is the other measures
capture more than just restrictions on capital inflows, and hence have more time-variation.
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Table 3.4: Capital Flow Deflection (Entire Sample)
(1) (2) Expected Signs
Global Push Factors




Domestic Pull Factors (all lagged)
Real GDP growth rate 0.425* 0.396* +
(0.219) (0.218)
Real GDP growth rate shock -0.369 -0.364 -
(0.231) (0.230)
Real GDP per capita (logged) 4.912*** 3.793* +
(1.219) (1.935)
De jure Capital inflow control 1.169 1.263 -
(1.256) (1.303)
Composite risk index 0.107 0.0982 +
(0.0720) (0.0729)
Spillovers
ROG’s inflow control 12.80** -6.113 +
(5.046) (32.55)
Year FE No Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Number of Countries 87 87
Sample Period 1,007 1,007
R-squared 0.137 0.165
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
of interest, the rest of group’s capital inflow controls (τS
−i
t ), is significant in the
standard push-pull factor model. But the variable becomes insignificant once I
control for the year fixed effects, implying that the spillover effect found in column
(1) is likely to be due to omitted variable bias. In particular, global push factors
other than the ones included in regression (3.12) may cause gross capital inflows in
a developing country and capital controls in the rest of the world to move in the
same direction. The lesson from Table 3.4 is, therefore, that the pull-push model
(3.12) explains gross capital inflows to developing countries reasonably well, but the
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evidence of spillover effects from the rest of the world is not robust.
The lack of evidence of capital flow deflection for the entire sample is hardly
surprising and is in line with other studies (Forbes et al., 2012). In particular,
note that this exercise is not a good test of the model in Section 2. An underlying
assumption of the model is that countries are identical, if not for the capital controls
they implement. In other words, there is a single perfectly integrated world capital
market, where all these countries are perfect substitutes from the perspective of
investors. This assumption clearly does not hold when I consider the entire sample,
where countries are highly heterogeneous, but it could be more reasonable when I
look at a smaller group of countries with similar characteristics. Specifically, capital
flow deflection may be significant within well defined groups of developing economies,
while still be on average irrelevant for the broad (and highly heterogeneous) sample.
This is precisely what I investigate next.
Capital Flow Deflection within Country Groups
In this subsection, I divide countries into groups of likely substitutes based on
some common characteristics and investigate the existence of capital flow deflection
within these groups. In particular, I group countries based on geographic location,
export specialization, return, and risk. In other words, I consider the subset of coun-
tries S to which country i belongs either as a geographic region (say, Latin America
or Sub-Saharan Africa) or as a group defined by certain economic characteristics
(say, fuel exporters, fast growing economies, or high risk countries).
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As discussed above, I use composite risk index as a proxy for country specific
risk and real GDP growth rate as a proxy for country specific return. I divide
countries into four groups based on their average real GDP growth rates and average
composite risk across the sample period. For example, low return group consists of
countries whose sample average growth rates are in the bottom 25 percentile. I
call these groups as time-invariant groups since the composition of groups remains
constant over time. To allow the composition of groups to change over time, I also
consider time-variant groups. For example, a country i belongs to the low return
group at time t if it is in the bottom 25 percentile among all countries at t. So a
country could move from low return group to medium-low return group as it grows
faster over time. Export specialization and geographic regions follow the definitions
used in the IMF’s WEO. As mentioned earlier, there are six geographic regions
and five export specializations. Table 3.1 shows the time-invariant groups based on
risk.21
Table 3.5 reports the coefficients for τS
−i
t , which is the main variable of interest.
The coefficients for the other variables are almost identical to the ones in Table 4.22
21There are 124 countries in the list, 78 of which are in bold. All the countries listed have both
GDP and capital inflow restriction data available throughout the sample period, which allows us
to compute the rest of the group’s capital inflow restrictions. The countries in bold are the ones
with at least ten years of observations for the rest of the explanatory variables, and hence are used
for regressions.
22The only major difference is the coefficient for a country’s own capital controls, which is
positive but insignificant in the specification with country fixed effects. This finding is consistent
with the empirical literature (see Magud et al., 2011) and results from the well-known endogeneity
problem between a country’s own capital controls and inflows (i.e. higher flows induce a country
to adjust prudential restrictions). Given the persistence of capital controls, it is not surprising
that simply lagging inflow restrictions does not entirely solve this problem. Forbes et al. (2013)
use a propensity score matching method to deal with this econometric challenge. They find that,
while broad measures of inflow controls may not be systematically effective, specific measures (e.g.
those targeting equity or bond flows) and “major” policy changes lead to a significant reduction
in capital inflows.
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Each coefficient reported in Table 3.5 is estimated using a different specification of
(3.12). There are 36 specifications in total. These specifications differ by country-
groups (which gives the six rows in the table) and by the set of controls (which gives
the six columns in the table). Specifically, in columns (1)-(3) and (4)-(6) I control for
a different combination of group contagion variable and country fixed effects, with
the number of controls increasing as the column number ascends. Country fixed
effects are introduced to reduce omitted variable bias. The group contagion variable
is computed as the GDP weighted fraction of countries in S−i that experience gross
inflow surge and is included to control for the common shocks to the group.23 Finally,
I lag the rest of the group’s inflow controls by one period in (4)-(6) to alleviate




I find strong evidence of within-group capital flow deflection when countries
are grouped based on risk as all coefficients have the correct sign and are highly
significant. Not surprisingly, grouping countries by time-variant risk groups gives
more robust results relative to the time-invariant risk groups (significance is at the
1% level), as foreign investors are likely to be sensitive to changes over time to
the riskiness of a country. I find no within-group spillover effect when counties are
grouped by geographic location, or returns. The results are robust when I deduct
FDIs from the definition of gross inflows, which suggests that short-term (portfolio
and other investment) flows are the main drivers of the spillover effect.25 Though






where Surgejt is defined in 3.2.4.
24In subsection 3.2.5, I use an IV approach to further address endogeneity concerns.
25The coefficients for the spillover variable are very similar to the ones shown in Table 3.4 and,
hence, are not reported in this chapter.
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Table 3.5: Within-Group Capital Flow Deflection
Group by geographic location 2.079 2.735 1.467 2.045
(3.654) (3.758) (4.283) (4.307)
Group by export specialization 8.470** 7.145 9.418** 8.363**
(4.185) (4.315) (3.845) (4.016)
Groups by returns
Time-invariant groups by growth rate 5.713 4.611 3.622 2.212
(6.440) (5.666) (4.100) (3.553)
Time-variant groups by growth rate 0.0706 -0.908 -2.731* -2.798**
(1.708) (1.636) (1.452) (1.404)
Groups by risks
Time-invariant groups by composite risk 10.52* 10.57* 5.215 7.901
(5.324) (5.322) (5.168) (5.563)
Time-variant groups by composite risk 4.451** 2.776 7.314*** 6.350**
(1.961) (1.831) (2.636) (2.426)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Contagion Variable No Yes Yes Yes
Lagged ROG’s inflow control No No Yes Yes
Note: This table reports the spillover coefficient β3 in regression equation (3.12) for 24
different specifications. Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 3.5 provides some evidence of capital deflection when countries are grouped
by export specialization, the finding is not robust to additional exercises in the
robustness check below (see e.g. Table 3.6).
To interpret the coefficients and therefore to understand the magnitude of
capital flow deflection, I compute the range of spillover effects for the increase in
capital inflow restrictions in Brazil in 2009 on the gross inflows of capital to South
Africa. Both countries belong to the same time-variant and time-invariant risk
group. In 2009, Brazil increased its capital inflow restriction by 0.42, and in the
same year South Africa’s gross capital inflows were 5.69% of its GDP. The coefficient
estimates of β3 when countries are grouped by (time-variant) risk ranges between
4.45 (without lagging τS
−i
t ). Using the estimated value, my calculation shows that
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South Africa’s gross capital inflows would have been 5.13% of its GDP if Brazil had
not increased its inflow restrictions in 2009. In other words we find that Brazil’s
introduction of inflow controls in 2009 increased gross inflows to South Africa by
0.56% of its GDP.
My findings indicate that capital flow deflection affects countries with similar
risk levels, more than neighbors. The lack of evidence of spillover effects at the
regional level, however, has more than one explanation. One possibility is that
investors, on average, do not see countries in the same region as sufficiently similar
to justify reallocation of investment within the group when one country increases
capital controls. However, a second explanation is that the capital deflection model
presented in the previous section is not the only mechanism at work. For instance,
investors may take an increase in inflow restrictions in one country as a signal that
others will introduce similar measures and, therefore, reduce rather than increase
investment to the latter. If this “policy emulation” or “contagion” effect is perceived
to be stronger among neighboring countries (perhaps because the electorate is more
likely to be informed on, and politicians to be influenced by, policy developments
in a nearby country), then it is possible that the capital flow deflection is offset by
a separate spillover effect in the opposite direction in regional groupings. In this




This subsection looks at several robustness tests of the result on capital flow
deflection. Specifically, I look at surges in capital inflows (rather than at the level of
gross inflows); I use measures of inflow restrictions other than the Schindler index; I
consider different ways to weigh the rest of group’s capital controls. I finally perform
a number of additional robustness tests.
First, I focus on surges in capital inflows. Recent studies such as Ghosh et al.
(2012) and Forbes et al. (2012) focus on episodes of extreme capital inflow that they
refer as surges. Instead of studying the spillover effects on the magnitude of gross
inflows, I investigate whether restrictions in other countries affect the probability
of experiencing a surge. I use a probit model in an otherwise identical push-pull
model:









where Surgeit equals to one if country i experiences a surge at time t, and zero other-
wise. Similar to Ghosh et al. (2012), I define a country to have a gross inflow surge
in a year if its gross inflow to GDP is greater than 80% of its historical values across
time and 80% of all countries’ values in that given year.26 The Probit regression
results of (3.14) are reported in Table 3.6. The results are largely consistent with
the findings in Table 3.5.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The second robustness test relates to the measure of inflow restrictions. To
see if the existence of capital flow deflection relies on the use of the Schindler index
of inflow controls, I use four alternative proxies of capital controls. The first two
proxies, called CAPIN and CAPITAL, come from the work of Quinn et al. (2009).
CAPIN measures capital account restrictions imposed on non-residents. CAPITAL
captures capital account restrictions on both residents and non-residents. The third
proxy, called FINCONT2, gives financial sector specific controls and comes from
the work of Ostry et al. (2012). 27 As both CAPITAL and FINCONT2 represent
general capital controls that include restrictions on both inflows and outflows, the
last proxy I consider is the updated Schindler’s index of inflow controls (Fernandez
et al., 2015).28
I replicate the same regressions as in Tables 3.5 with these variables. The
results are reported in Table 3.7, where each row reports the coefficients for τS
−i
t in
equation (3.12) in the time-variant group. Due to data availability, I have a smaller
sample. As for the regressions with the Schindler index, there is no spillover effect
when we do not divide countries into groups. However, once I divide countries into
27The data for the CAPITAL index cover restrictions imposed on capital flows by residents and
by nonresidents. FINCONT2 is computed as an average of three components: (i) differential treat-
ment of accounts held by nonresidents; (ii) limits on borrowing from abroad; and (iii) restrictions
on maintenance of accounts abroad. The correlation between the various indexes is reported in
the appendix. I rescale all proxies along the interval [0, 1] with 0 indicating full capital account
liberalization, so they are comparable to the Schindler’s index of inflow controls. The pairwise
correlations of these proxies are provided in Table D.2 in the appendix.
28Another commonly used proxy for capital controls comes from Chinn and Ito (2009). However
this measure is less refined than the Schindler index and the other measures used here. Specifically,
the Chinn-Ito index is compiled from a broader set of policies than capital controls: they include
exchange rate policy, trade policy, and current account policy. As this measure is less appropriate
to test the theory, I am not surprised to find no robust capital flow deflection when I proxy capital
controls with the Chinn-Ito index. For more discussions on and detailed comparisons of various
proxies of capital controls refer to Quinn et al. (2011).
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groups based on (time-variant) risks, I find evidence of capital flow deflection in
most specifications as in Table 3.5.
Third, I consider using different weights to compute the rest of the group’s
capital controls τS
−i
t . In particular, I use gross capital inflows and exports as al-
ternative weights to calculate τS
−i
t . Then I rerun the regressions of Table 3.5 when
countries are grouped based on composite risks, and the results are reported in Table
3.8. The coefficient on the spillover variable continues to be significant when using
these different weights.29
Finally, I also undertake a number of additional robustness tests.30 First, to
see if the consistent finding of spillover effects among risk groups depends on the
composite risk measure, I consider other measures of country risk. In particular, I
divide countries based on their index values of law and order and I still continue to
find robust capital flow deflection. Second, I use other proxies for returns. Specif-
ically, I divide countries by return on assets, return on equities, and short term
treasury bond yields. The sample is smaller as coverage for these variables is more
limited. In any event, I do not find evidence of capital flow deflection across groups
of countries with similar returns with any of these proxies.31 Last, I replace the
inflow controls by general capital controls, which is the average of inflow controls











30The findings of these exercises are not reported here, but are available upon request. All the
regressions in this subsection are robust when we deduct FDI from gross inflows.
31The full list of the different ways I grouped countries by return is: (i) Return on assets from
bank-level data; (ii) Return on equity from bank-level data; (iii) Government bond yield; (iv) Stock
market return. In addition, we also ran regressions dividing countries by GDP per capita (a proxy
for the level of development) and GDP (a proxy for the country size). As discussed in the main


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.8: Robustness Check of Within-Group Capital Deflection: Different Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weighted by Average Gross Inflows 3.051 1.857 4.826** 4.311*
(1.948) (1.958) (2.290) (2.204)
Weighted by Average Exports 4.407** 2.781 6.130** 5.322**
(2.048) (1.755) (2.575) (2.356)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Contagion No Yes No Yes
Lagged τS−i No No Yes Yes
Note: This table reports the spillover coefficient β3 in regression equation (3.12) with
three different weighting schemes and the countries are divided into time-variant groups
based on risk. The Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
and outflow controls and redo the regressions in Table 3.5. Capital flow deflection
still holds. This finding is consistent with an interpretation of the signaling story
in Bartolini and Drazen (1997) that international investors may interpret tighter
outflow controls as a signal for future tighter inflow controls.
Cluster Analysis
So far countries are grouped based on a single characteristic: geographical
locations, export specializations, real GDP growth rates, or composite risk index. As
a result, countries in the same group only share one common feature. Next, I group
countries using an array of country characteristics, so countries in the same group
share more than one common features. In particular, I consider real GDP growth
rate, real GDP, real GDP per capita, composite risk index, and general capital
controls.32 I consider these variables because they capture some of the important
32All variables are standardized so their standard deviations are 1.
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aspects of a country that are relevant to international investors. I will use k-means







||xj − µi||2 (3.15)
where S = {S1, S2, S3, S4} with Si 6= ∅ ∀i, and ∪iSi = S, where S is the
set of all the sample countries. xj is the vector of covariates of country j. µi is
the sample average of xj for j ∈ Si when k-means clustering is used, and µi is the
sample median when k-medians clustering is used.33
Groups identified using k-means clustering with absolute distance are reported
in Table D.3. Notice the groups are highly unbalanced. Cluster 1 includes 29
countries, cluster 2 includes 6 countries, cluster 3 includes 5 countries, and cluster
4 includes 44 countries. However, the cluster analysis is able to group 4 members of
BRICS in the same cluster together with Mexico (cluster 3). I rerun the regression
specification (2) of Table 3.5 for the groups identified using cluster analysis, and
results are shown in Table 3.9. There is no evidence of capital deflection among
countries with similar economic characteristics. So the evidence of capital deflection
is restricted to countries with similar risk levels.
Endogeneity: Instrumental Variables
To address possible endogeneity bias, I follow an instrumental variables ap-
proach to estimate specification (3.12). Omitted variables may be a concern as
33Euclideane distance is used to measure similarity in equation (3.9), I also consider using ab-
solute difference to measure similarity.
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Table 3.9: Within-Group Capital Deflection: Cluster Analysis
k-means k-medians
Euclidean Absolute Euclidean Absolute
Distance Distance Distance Distance
Domestic Pull Factors (all lagged)
Real GDP growth rate 0.317 0.317 0.325 0.314
(0.215) (0.215) (0.223) (0.214)
Real GDP growth rate shock -0.319 -0.325 -0.361 -0.321
(0.231) (0.231) (0.237) (0.231)
Real GDP per capita (logged) 5.416** 5.346** 5.577** 5.316**
(2.415) (2.408) (2.461) (2.437)
De jure Capital inflow control 1.720 1.824 1.732 1.871
(1.276) (1.241) (1.243) (1.230)
Composite risk index 0.0610 0.0504 0.0519 0.0514
(0.0705) (0.0728) (0.0711) (0.0724)
Spillovers
ROG’s inflow control 2.862 -2.724 1.083 -2.119
(5.466) (3.563) (5.734) (4.322)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 909 909 909 909
R-squared 0.160 0.161 0.158 0.161
Number of Countries 68 68 68 68
Note: This table reports the spillover coefficient β3 in regression equation (3.12) when
countries are divided into time-invariant groups using cluster analysis. The Robust stan-
dard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
countries can experience a surge in inflows because of a common shock to the group.
If some countries react to the surge by increasing their controls while others do not,
I can find a correlation between the policy of the first and the inflow surge to the
latter, but this correlation would not reflect a causal relationship. Furthermore,
reverse causality may also be a concern as the rest of the group might see higher
capital inflows to a member as a signal of a capital inflow surge to the entire group.
If this is the case, the rest of the group may respond to inflows to country i by
increasing contemporaneous capital inflow restrictions. For these reasons, I gener-
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ate three instruments that are correlated with the capital controls in the rest of
the groups but not with the capital inflows to country i, and use shocks to these
variables to identify the effect on inflows to i.
The first instrument is based on the electoral cycle, as governments may be
more willing to raise capital controls before elections in an attempt to depreciate
the real exchange rate and improve competitiveness. This instrument, denoted by
electS
−i
t , is the GDP weighted fraction of the countries belonging to the subset S
−i










where electjt+1 equals 1 if country j has an election in year t+ 1, and 0 otherwise.
The second instrument is based on the political leaning of the ruling govern-
ment, as the right-wing governments are generally found to be less likely to employ
capital controls (Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1997, and Ghosh et al., 2014), possibly
for ideological reasons. This instrument, denoted as rightS
−i
t , is the GDP weighted










where righttt equals to 1 if country j has a right-wing government in year t, and 0
if it has a left-wing or a centrist government.34
34The data on election year and the government’s political orientation are from World Bank’s
Database of Political Institutions.
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The results for the IV specification when countries are grouped by (time-
variant) risk are reported in Table 3.10.35 As discussed above, I expect that the
instruments are correlated with inflow restrictions in group S−i, but that they do
not directly affect the dependent variable, as there is no a priori reason why the
electoral cycle, or the political color of countries in the same group as country i
are directly associated with capital inflows to i. In fact, the first stage results have
the expected sign and the F-statistic of the regression indicates that none of the
instruments is weak. Specifically, the upcoming election instrument is positive and
significant, while the right-wing government instruments is negative and significant.
The second stage regression results show that the capital controls in the rest of the
group still have a positive impact on capital flows to country i and the size of the
coefficients is comparable to the main regressions. The instruments also pass the
over-identification test (Hansen J statistic) and endogeneity test (C statistic).
Endogeneity: Propensity Score-Matching
As another effort to address the potential endogeneity problem, I use propen-
sity score-matching to estimate the spillover effects.36 In particular, the countries
that experience an increase of the capital controls in the rest of the group could be
different from those that do not experience an increase of capital controls in the rest
of the group. One approach to correct for this selection bias is to use propensity
35Due to the data restriction, I have smaller samples for IV regressions. Hence I divide countries
into three groups instead. The results in Table 3.5 continue to hold when countries are divided
into three groups.
36I would like to thank Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan for suggesting me to use propensity score-
matching.
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Table 3.10: Within-group Capital Flow Deflection: IV
Second Stage
Rest of the Group’s Inflow Control 8.791*
(5.206)
First Stage
Upcoming Election Instrument 0.154***
(0.0365)
Right-Wing Government Instrument -0.308***
(0.0389)
IV Tests
First Stage F statistic for the instruments 19.677
P-value of F statistic 0.000
Hansen J statistic 0.415
P-value of Hansen J statistic 0.839
GMM C statistic 1.96
P-value of GMM C statistic 0.162
Year FE Yes
Country FE Yes
Group Contagion Variable Yes
Observations 448
Number of Countries 35
Note: The sample consists of 64 countries. GDP per capita and composite risk index are
insignificant in all specifications and hence not reported in the table to save space. All
regressions control for year fixed effects and group contagion variable. Robust standard
errors clustered at country level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
score-matching.







−(n+ 1)/2 if ∆τS−it ≤ 0.
(3.16)
So country i is “treated” if there is an increase of capital controls in the rest of
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the group. The treatment variable is unusual compared to the ones in the other
policy evaluation works: the “treatment” defined in (3.17) is not a domestic policy
intervention, but (a weighted average of) policy interventions abroad.
Propensity score-matching imputes the missing potential outcome for each
“subject” (country-year pair) by using an average of the outcomes of similar “sub-
jects” that do not receive the treatment. Similarity between “subjects” is based on
the estimated probabilities of receiving the treatment, known as propensity scores.
I estimate the probability of a country receiving “treatment” using a logit model:
Prob(Di,t = 1) = F (βxi,t + e
i
t), (3.17)
where xi,t include all the variables in the pull and push factor model (3.12), as
well as the fraction of the rest of the group with an inflow surge, and country
and time dummies. The results of the logit regression is reported in Table 3.11.
The group variable, the fraction of the rest of the group with an inflow surge (the
group contagion variable), is positive and significant. So the more countries of a
group experience inflow surges, the more likely the rest of the group as a whole
increase capital controls. However, all the domestic variables are insignificant.37 An
explanation is that the ”treatment” is not a domestic policy intervention, but (a
weighted average of) policy interventions in the rest of the group.
I am interested in the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is
37I rerun the logit regression with additinoal country characteristics in xi,t, including those used
to estimate the probit model in Table 3.13 and lagged inflows as well as lagged surge dummy
Surgei,t. The result remains the same: all the country characteristics are insignificant, and only
the group variable could explain the treatment probability.
111
Table 3.11: Determination of Treatment: logit
Domestic Variables (lagged)
Real GDP growth rate 0.0575
(0.0495)
Real GDP growth rate shock -0.0540
(0.0559)
Real GDP per capita (logged) 0.187
(0.473)
De jure Capital inflow control -0.614
(0.458)
Composite risk index -0.0456
(0.0432)
Group Variable





Note: Time-variant risk groups are used for the regressions. Robust standard errors
clustered at country level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
equal to the average of the difference between the observed treated outcomes,denoted
y1,i,t, and potential untreated outcomes, denoted y0,i,t, for the treated “subjects”:
ATT = E(y1,i,t − y0,i,t|Di,t = 1). (3.18)
If there is capital flow deflection, ATT should be positive. However, y0,i,t of the
treated “subjects” are unobservable. Under the conditional mean independence
assumption, (3.18) could be rewritten as
ATT = E(y1,i,t|xi,t, Di,t = 1)− E(y0,i,t|xi,t, Di,t = 0). (3.19)
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The advantage of (3.19) is that it could be estimated using observable data. The
estimated ATT is reported in Table 3.12. The average treatment effect on the
treated is positive but insignificant. So I could not find significant within-group
spillover effect using propensity score-matching.
Table 3.12: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
Coefficient AI Robust Std. Err. z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
.0213 .532 0.04 0.968 ( -1.023, 1.066)
Note: ATT is esimated using “teffects psmatch” command introduced in Stata 13. The
advantage of this new command over the old one (“psmatch2”) is that it takes into the
account the fact that the propensity scores are estimated, not observed (see Stata 13
User’s Guide).
There are several possible explanations of the insignificant ATT. First, the
estimation of propensity score suffers from omitted variable bias. If the model suffers
from selection bias that is related to country characteristics, then the treatment
probability depends on unobservable variables as all the domestic variables in Table
3.11 are insignificant, and in this case it is invalid to use propensity score-matching
as the conditional independence assumption would be violated (Heckman and Robb,
1985; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
Forbes et al. (2013) use propensity score-matching to study the impact of
countries’ own capital controls on their macroeconomic variables, and they point
out a few problems of applying propensity score-matching to panel data: “a ma-
jor challenge for much of the international/macroeconomic literature is having a
sufficient number of ‘similar’ observations to form a control group; this criteria is
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unlikely to be met.”
3.3.3 Evidence of Policy Response
In this subsection I analyze the empirical evidence of policy responses to capital
flow deflection (Proposition 6). In particular, I use a probit model to investigate
whether the probability of imposing capital inflow restrictions in one country is
affected by capital controls set by other countries.
There is little empirical literature on the determinants of capital controls.
Fratzcher (2011) studies capital controls largely in the context of more industrial-
ized economies.38 Fernandez et al. (2013) investigate whether countries use capital
controls for prudential reasons and focus only on the cyclical components of these
measures. Due to the lack of established empirical literature in the field, I study the
determinants of a country’s decision to change capital inflow controls using a parsi-
monious empirical model with the pull-push factors that are found to affect capital
inflows in the previous section, complemented by additional controls suggested by
the theory in Section 2 and by other studies on capital controls. The specification
is:







where Incit is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if country i raises inflow restric-
tions at time t and 0 otherwise.39 Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function.
38I tried using the specifications in Fratzcher (2011) to study capital controls in developing
countries, but the model yields little explanatory power.
39As countries are more likely to increase controls on destabilizing/short-term inflows such as
bond inflows rather than FDIs, we run the same regressions in this subsection excluding FDI








t−1 is a measure of the change in inflow restrictions by countries in
group S−i, excluding country i. As indicated above, xt includes the pull and push
factors in the previous subsection. These factors may be important determinants of
a change in capital inflow restrictions as they influence gross capital inflows, which
in turn may trigger a policy response by the government. In addition xit includes
time fixed effects, group contagion variable, and a number of other variables (dis-
cussed below) that may be correlated with a government’s decision to increase inflow
restrictions.
The key variable of interest in this subsection is ∆τS
−i
t . Proposition 6 predicts
that whether capital controls are complements or substitutes depends on the motive
for which they are used. If inflow restrictions are motivated by a desire to manipulate
the domestic interest rate, such as in the case of prudential capital controls, then
the country will respond to an increase in inflow restrictions by other borrowers by
raising its own controls. On the other hand, when the motive for capital controls
is to manipulate the world interest rate, then the nature of the relationship among
capital controls imposed by different countries is ambiguous. As small countries
cannot influence the world interest rate, they only have domestic motives to use
capital controls. I then expect the coefficient of ∆τS
−i
t to be positive for small
economies and ambiguous for large economies.
I also introduce in the specification a number of variables that may affect the
decision of a government to increase capital controls, either to manipulate the world
interest rate or to manipulate the domestic interest rate. Specifically, I control for the
real GDP since the model in Section 2 predicts that larger countries are more likely
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to manipulate the inter-temporal terms of trade with their capital control policies.
While developing economies play a small role in international financial markets
relative to advanced economies, it is still possible that certain larger countries exert
at least some market power if markets are segmented, for instance because various
economies are perceived to be imperfect substitutes by international investors. I
also include REER (real effective exchange rate) overvaluation, domestic inflation,
a flexible exchange rate regime dummy, and external debt since these variables may
affect the decision to use capital controls as a means to manipulate the domestic
interest rate for prudential reasons or for other non-prudential reasons.40
Table 3.13 reports the results of the probit regression (3.20) when countries are
grouped following the approach of the previous subsection. Due to data availability
of inflation and de facto exchange rate regime, our sample size now reduces to 64.41
The probit model has a reasonable good fit as indicated by the Pseudo R-squares.
To save space, I do not report the coefficients of the traditional pull factors that are
not significant in any specification.
I find no evidence of within-group policy response as all the coefficients of
∆τS
−i
t are insignificant. This is true regardless of how I group countries: notably,
this is true when I use risk-groups that display large and significant capital flow
deflection. While the sample is composed of developing countries that are small
relative to the size of the global financial market, one could argue that at least some
of these countries are large within the groups they belong to and set capital controls
40I also include lagged gross inflows and lagged inflow surge dummy as additional controls. Their
coefficients are insignificant and the policy response coefficient remains unchanged.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to exploit this market power. If this is the case, then the lack of evidence may
be resulting from the fact that capital flow deflection is leading these countries to
respond by decreasing rather than increasing their controls. However, the lack of
evidence of a policy response appears to be a very resilient result. In particular, it
persists also if I drop larger developing economies from the sample to remove possible
terms of trade motive (no matter what definition I give to “large economy”).
I also undertake a series of robustness tests, none of which changes the finding
of no policy response. First, I use a linear probability model of (3.20), where I
introduce country fixed effects. The regression results are reported in Table D.4
in the appendix. Note that several of the control variables that were significant
in Table 3.13 (such as the REER overvaluation) become insignificant, suggesting
that unobserved country characteristics, rather than the time dimension of these
variables, are correlated with the decision to increase inflow restrictions. More
importantly for the analysis, the OLS regression results of the linear probability
model yield the same findings as the probit model, namely the coefficient of ∆τS
−i
t
continues to be statistically insignificant for all country groups.42
As an alternative to the policy change variable ∆τS
−i
t , I use a different defini-
tion of the main control variable and I replicate the results in Tables 3.13 and D.4.
In particular, I define DS
−i










42I also run instrumental variable regressions replacing ∆τS
−i
t with the sets of instruments
introduced in Section 3.2.5, and these regressions yield the same results.
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where Djt is a categorical variable that takes value 1 if country j tightens inflow
control at t, −1 if j lowers inflow control, and 0 if there is no change. The results
are largely the same, except that I find a policy response within export groups, but
it is only significant at 10%. The coefficient of the main variable of interest for all
other groupings is never significant.
Next, I conduct the same exercises focusing on a decrease (rather than an
increase) in inflow controls as the dependent variable. I rerun the regressions in
Tables 3.13 and D.4. Again, I do not find robust within-group policy response.
A final concern is that countries might experience a heterogeneity in external-
ities of capital inflows that is not captured by the model. For example, in countries
facing borrowing constraints, the level of capital inflows might be sub-optimally low.
In this case the capital flow deflection would correspond to a positive externality
and hence it would not necessarily induce the government to increase inflow con-
trols. To control for this, I introduce a dummy for countries that have experienced
a recent default and interact this dummy with the spillover variable. I still do not
find evidence of policy response for countries that have not had a recent default (i.e.
for those that are less likely to face borrowing constraint).43
An important question is what explains the discrepancy between the theory
in Section 2 and the lack of empirical evidence of a policy response in this section.
While I do not have a firm answer to this question, I have three explanations for the
puzzle. A first explanation has to do with the data methodology used to compile
de jure indices of capital controls. These measures capture the extensive margin of
43The results of robustness checks are available upon request.
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restrictions, but not their intensive margin. In other words, if a regulation or a tax
on a certain category of financial transactions becomes more stringent, this would
not necessarily be reflected in the available indices that code information in a binary
form (0 for unrestricted transactions and 1 for restricted ones).44 This methodology
could bias the regression results as it reduces the variability of capital controls by
construction. The second explanation has to do with the dominant view on capital
controls in the historical period under analysis. Until recently, restrictions to capital
flows were not considered as “legitimate” prudential policies. In this environment,
governments may have been concerned that the use of capital controls could send
a negative signal to international markets, as highlighted in the work of Bartolini
and Drazen (1997). In this case, governments would weigh the benefit of prudential
controls to offset domestic market distortions arising from excessive capital inflows
with the reputation costs of introducing such measures. This may also suggest
that governments might have preferred the use of policy instruments other than
inflow controls when facing capital flow deflection. Again, the end result would be
a muted policy response. A third explanation is that governments, or at least some
governments, are in practice less likely to use prudential controls than predicted by
the theory, because the problem that they face is a sub-optimally low level of capital
inflows rather than excessively large and volatile flows. For these countries a sudden
surge in inflows as a result of a policy change by others alleviates an existing market
failure. While, as discussed above, I try to address this concern in the regression,
difficulties to access international financial markets may still contribute to explain
44See Appendix C for further details.
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the low policy response to capital flow deflection that I find in the data.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter presents a simple model of capital flow deflection, by which we
mean the increase in capital inflows to third markets as a result of tightening of
capital controls in some countries, and of the policy response that this cross-border
spillover effect can induce in other countries. We test the implications of the model
for a large sample of developing economies between 1995 and 2009 and find strong
evidence of capital flow deflection, but no evidence of a policy response.
These empirical findings complement recent work on capital controls, which
allows to draw some, admittedly preliminary, conclusions. First, both the event
studies on Brazil (Forbes et al, 2013, and Lambert et al, 2011) and the cross-
sectional approach indicate that capital controls deflect inflows to countries with
similar risk levels. This spillover effect is economically relevant and, when we focus
on a change in policy in Brazil, the magnitudes are comparable across studies.
These findings indicate that capital controls, even when improving the management
of capital flows to a country, may render more difficult the management of flows for
others. As discussed in the theory section, these multilateral effects could lead to
an inefficient equilibrium in realistic environments where governments have limited
policy instruments and/or markets are incomplete.
Second, both the studies on the determinants of capital controls (Fratzscher,
2013 and Fernandez et al, 2013) and the results on the policy response cast doubts
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on the use of capital controls for prudential reasons. However, this lack of evidence
may be driven by the methodology used to collect cross-country data on inflow
restrictions and/or by the specificity of the historical period under analysis, a pe-
riod when capital controls were seen as stigma that governments might have been
concerned with sending a negative signal to markets using capital controls. In the
coming years, the changing view on the use of capital controls (IMF, 2012) may well
lead governments to manage capital flows more actively to address domestic dis-
tortions. This will also increase the frequency of episodes of capital flow deflection
and, possibly, of retaliatory responses as predicted by the theory. Combined with
the availability of more detailed data, future empirical work may provide a different
upshot.
In concluding this chapter, I would like to come back to the question we posed
in the beginning. What does capital flow deflection imply for the design of the multi-
lateral institutions needed to govern international capital flows? Ideally, multilateral
rules on capital controls should aim at preserving some flexibility for efficiency en-
hancing capital controls, while limiting the negative consequences associated with
capital flow deflection.
The regulation of safeguards in the WTO (i.e. the restriction of imports that
cause injury to a country) may provide some useful lessons. Both safeguards and
capital controls introduce valuable flexibility in their respective systems and both
lead to deflection of trade and capital flows, respectively. But safeguards are tightly
regulated in the WTO. First, they need to be temporary and respectful of the
most favored nation (MFN) clause, that is safeguards cannot discriminate between
122
different trading partners. Second, Art. XIX of GATT and other clauses of the
WTO Agreements circumscribe the situations where a safeguard can rightfully be
applied. Third, the use of safeguards is subject to the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, which allows any member affected by the measure to request that a
neutral panel reviews its consistency with WTO rules. Whether this regulatory
framework can serve as a source of inspiration to deal with capital flow deflection is
a question left for future research.
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Appendix A: Derivations and Proofs
A.1 Solution to the Constrained Planner’s Problem





− cT − d−1
)














− λCPCC = 0
Envelope theorem gives
V CPw = −γλw
V CPd = −λCP
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Complementary slackness requires
1λh>0 + 1λw>0 = 1
Substitute the first envelope condition into the first FOC:
uT − γβwTEλ′w − λCP + λCPCCΨT + λwwT = 0 (A.1)
Substitute the first envelope condition into the second FOC,
uNf
′(h)− γβwhEλ′w − λh + λCPCCΨh + λwwh = 0 (A.2)
When λw > 0, λh = 0, then (A.2) can be rewritten as







Substitute it into (A.1):









, when λw > 0 (A.3)
When λw = 0, then (A.1) can be rewritten as









when λw > 0







when λw > 0
−βγwTE [λ′w] when λw = 0
so (A.3) and (A.4) can be combined and rewritten as









Substitute the second envelope condition into the third FOC,
λCP = (1 + r)βEλCP
′
+ (1 + r)λCPCC (A.6)

























A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof Since the laissez-faire equilibrium is identical to the constrained-optimal al-
locations, so I just need to consider the cost when the present collateral constraint
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is slack. Then household’s Euler equation in the decentralized economy is
uT = (1 + r)(1 + τ)βEu
′
T
Substitute (2.33) into the household’s Euler equation in the decentralized economy,















which is identical to the constrained planner’s Euler equation. And since the rest
of the equilibrium conditions in the decentralized economy are identical to the con-
strained planner’s problem, then the decentralized equilibrium allocations are iden-
tical to the constrained-optimal allocations. .
A.3 Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Partial Equilibrium
Lemma 3 (Existence and Uniqueness of the Financially-Unconstrained Equilibrium)
EE and WR always have an unique intersection.
Proof Since EE is downward sloping, and WR is upward sloping or perfectly ver-
tical.
Lemma 4 (Existence and Uniqueness of the Financially-Constrained Equilibrium)
When EE and WR intersect inside the deleveraging area, WR and CC always have
an unique intersection lying below EE.
Proof Straightforward by discussing all four cases.
Lemma 3 guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibrium when the collateral
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constraint is slack, and 4 guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibrium when the
financially-unconstrained equilibrium does not exist. Therefore Lemmas 3 and 4
together guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. However, the two lemmas do
not guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium as the collateral constraint could
be binding at one equilibrium while slack at the other. For example in Figure A.1,
points A,B, and C all are equilibria of the model. The equilibrium is financially-
unconstrained at point A, while it is financially constrained at B and D. The
economy is at full employment at A and B, while there is unemployment at C.














The model features multiple equilibria because of the collateral constraint,1 a
feature of the rational expectations and the partial equilibrium. Imagine interna-
tional investors could form different belief of the country’s ability to borrow. At A,
the international investors believe the country has ability to repay all the debt (high
1Without the wage rigidity, the multiple equilibria are at points A, B, and D where the full
employment line intersects with EE and CC.
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collateral), therefore the country is financially unconstrained and the consumption
and output is high, and the collateral (GDP) ends up being high which confirms
the initial positive belief. At C, the international investors believe the country has
trouble paying back the debt, therefore the country is borrowing constrained, which
lowers both consumption and output and hence the collateral ends up being low
which confirms the investor’s initial negative belief.
A and B are not saddle-path stable. The reason is that the future consump-
tion is endogenous and determined by the debt accumulated in the present period.
Suppose the EE in Figure 2.1 is associated with the debt level at C. If the economy
consumes at A or B, the debt goes up and future consumption goes down, therefore
EE would shift down given τ . And when EE associated with the debt levels at A
and B intersect with WR inside the deleverage area, A and B are not dynamically
rational expectations. Therefore, I impose the following stringent selection criteria:
Definition 7 (Equilibrium Selection Criteria) When there are multiple equi-
libria, let the unique equilibrium be the one associated with the lowest debt level.
Once I imposed the selection criteria 7, I have the following definition:




′}, the equilibrium is determined by the lowest intersection of WR and CC
that lies below EE. If such point does not exist, then the equilibrium is determined
by the intersection of EE and WR.
It then follows from Lemmas 3 and 4 that the equilibrium defined in Definition
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8 exists and is unique.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Maximizing (3.7) subject to (3.5), and taking both market frictions into ac-
count -domestic externality and market power-, we obtain the following Euler equa-
tion:




Let us investigate separately the two distinct motives for policy intervention,
starting with the prudential motive. If country i does not affect the world market
equilibrium (mi = 0), then it is dR/d[mi(ci1 − yi1)] = 0. Hence, for a borrowing
country (ci1 − yi1 > 0), the Euler equation above simplifies to
u′(ci1) = β
iRu′(ci2) + x
′(ci1 − yi1). (A.10)
In order for (3.4) to be equal to (A.10), it must be
u′(ci1)
βiR(1 + τ i)
=
u′(ci1)− x′(ci1 − yi1)
βiR
,
from which we obtain the formula for the optimal prudential capital controls as
τ̂ i = x′(ci1 − yi1)/[u′(ci1)− x′(ci1 − yi1)].
For a lending country (ci1 − yi1 ≤ 0) instead, it is e(ci1 − yi1) = 0, and thus
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all frictions disappear. As a result, the solution to the welfare maximization for a
rational forward-looking national planner coincides with the utility maximization
of the representative consumer, and the optimal prudential policy becomes τ̂ i1 = 0.
Hence, depending on whether country i is lender or borrower, its optimal prudential
capital controls can be described by the step function defined in (3.10).
Let us now introduce the terms-of-trade motive. If country i is able to affect
the world market equilibrium (mi > 0), then it is dR/d[mi(ci1 − yi1)] 6= 0, and its
unilateral optimal policy is found by equalizing Euler equation (3.8) with the one
solved under the decentralized optimization problem (3.4). After a few algebraic
steps, we obtain the optimal policy as
1 + τ i∗ = (1 + τ̂ i)(1 + τ̃ i).
The expression for τ̂ i is given in (3.10), while the one for τ̃ i is given by τ̃ i =
mi ·ε−i, where ε−i represents the inverse elasticity of global savings faced by country












d(Y −i1 − C−i1 )
Y −i1 − C−i1
R
. (A.11)







A.5 Proof of Proposition 6








(1 + τ̃ i) +
dτ̃ i
dτS−i
(1 + τ̂ i),
where τ̂ i, τ̃ i > 0 for a large country.
(i) We now prove that dτ̂ i/dτS
−i









Lemma 1 has proven that dR∗/dτS
−i
< 0. We only need to show that dτ̂ i/dR <
0. Define




i))− x′(ci1(R, τ̂ i)− yi1)
− τ̂ i = 0
as the implicit function of τ̂ i w.r.t. R when country i is a borrower. By the implicit










u′(ci1) · x′′(ci1 − yi1)− u′′(ci1) · x′(ci1 − yi1)




which is strictly negative, given that u′, x′, x′′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and ∂ci1/∂R < 0.
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u′(ci1) · x′′(ci1 − yi1)− u′′(ci1) · x′(ci1 − yi1)




which is also strictly negative. It then follows dτ̂ i/dR < 0 for all borrowing countries,
which completes the proof of part (i).
(ii) We are now going to prove that dτ̃ i/dτS
−i
may be positive or negative.




] ≡ miε−i(τ̃ i, τS−i)− τ̃ i = 0.

















which can be positive or negative. In fact, exploiting the expression for ε−i given in












d(Y −i1 − C−i1 )2
≶0





























For ease of reference, the sign of each term is reported in the expression above.
The sign of expression (A.12) is then ambiguous as both the numerator and the
denominator can be either positive or negative.
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Appendix B: Numerical Solution Method
B.1 Constrained Efficient Allocations
I solve the constrained planner’s problem by value function iteration. The
value function is defined by (2.20). The difficult part is to find the feasible set. The
feasible set is determined by the state variables (d−1, w−1, yT , r). Notice for given
state variables, I can plot WR and CC as in Figure B.1. The constrained planner
could choose from any point along the bolded line, which is the segment of WR that
is below point B. B is the lowest intersection of CC and WR. The allocations at B
are solved from (2.35) and (2.36). Therefore, the feasible allocations are determined.
The rest is standard.
To summarize: for given state variables (d−1, w−1, yT , r) and initial guess of
value function V 0(d−1, w−1, yT , r), solve (2.20) by choosing allocations from the fea-
sible set—the allocations on WR that is below B and using V 0(d−1, w−1, yT , r) for
computing the expectation of the next period’s value function. A new value function
is solved this way. Repeat the process until the value function converges.
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Note: The feasible allocations are indicated by the bold lines.
B.2 Laissez-faire Equilibrium Allocations
The more challenging problem is to solve for the laissez-faire allocations. I will
use policy function iteration with the help of the graphical framework for solving
this problem.
Given initial guess of the decision rules c0T (d−1, w−1, yT , r) and h
0(d−1, w−1, yT , r),
for any given (d−1, w−1, yT , r)I redefine EE curve as
(cT )
−1/ξ [c(cT , h






















= h0 ((1 + r)(yT − d−1 − cT ), w(cT , h), y′T , r′)
Step 0 Use the policy functions of the constrained planner’s problem as the
initial guess of policy functions, c0T (d−1, w−1, yT , r) and h
0(d−1, w−1, yT , r).
Step1 Solve for the intersection of EE and WR, point A from (2.35) and
(B.1), denote the solution cAT (d−1, w−1, yT , r) and h
A(d−1, w−1, yT , r).
Step2 If point A satisfies the collateral constraint (2.23), then it is the equi-
librium and the new policy functions are
c1T (d−1, w−1, yT , r) = c
A
T (d−1, w−1, yT , r)
and
h1(d−1, w−1, yT , r) = h
A(d−1, w−1, yT , r).
Step3 If point A does not satisfy the collateral constraint, solve for the
intersection of WR and CC, point B from (2.35) and (2.36), denote the solution
cBT (d−1, w−1, yT , r) and h
B(d−1, w−1, yT , r). and the new policy functions are
c1T (d−1, w−1, yT , r) = c
B
T (d−1, w−1, yT , r)
and
h1(d−1, w−1, yT , r) = h
B(d−1, w−1, yT , r).
Iterate policy functions cT (d−1, w−1, yT , r) and h(d−1, w−1, yT , r) by repeating
steps 1-3 until the policy functions converge.
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B.3 Optimal Tax
After solving for the constrained efficient policy functions {cCPT (d−1, w−1, yT , r),
cCPN (d−1, w−1, yT , r), d
CP (d−1, w−1, yT , r), w
CP (d−1, w−1, yT , r)}, compute optimal tax
using the following formula
τ ∗(d−1, w−1, yT , r) =
uT
(
cCPT (d−1, w−1, yT , r), c
CP
N (d−1, w−1, yT , r)
)
β(1 + r)E{y′T ,r′|yT ,r}uT (c
CP
T (d
CP , wCP , y′T , r
′), cCPN (d
CP , wCP , y′T , r
′))
when the collateral constraint is slack at (d−1, w−1, yT , r), and τ
∗(d−1, w−1, yT , r) = 0
otherwise.
To compute the decomposition of optimal tax, I need to approximate two
shadow price functions λCPw and λ
CP from the value function V CP (d−1, w−1, yT , r)
derived from the value function iteration illustrated in the last section. To approxi-
mate these two shadow price functions we need to assume the continuity of the first
derivatives of the constrained planner’s value function: V CPd and V
CP
w .
Under the continuity assumption, I can use the Newton’s method to approxi-
mate V CPd and V
CP
w . Then
λCPw (d−1, w−1, yT , r) = −
V CPw (d−1, w−1, yT , r)
γ
and
λCP (d−1, w−1, yT , r) = −V CPd (d−1, w−1, yT , r).
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Then I can find use the following equation to find λCPCC :
λCPCC(d−1, w−1, yT , r) =
λCP (d−1, w−1, yT , r)
1 + r
+ βE{y′T ,r′|yT ,r}V
CP
d (d
CP , wCP , y′T , r
′)
Now it remains to apply the formulas to computing the decomposition of tax.
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Appendix C: Schindler’s Measure of Capital Controls
Schindler (2009) compiles de jure indices of inflow and outflow controls us-
ing publicly available information from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Ar-
rangements and Exchange Restriction (AREAER). Schindler (2009) fully exploits
the IMF’s post 1996 disaggregated reporting of different categories of capital trans-
action. The categories covered in his index are as follows:
• Restrictions on transactions in equities (eq), bonds (bo), money market in-
struments (mm), and collective investments (ci). Transactions are divided
into four categories:
– Purchase locally by nonresidents (plbn)
– Sale or issue abroad by residents (siar)
– Purchase abroad by residents (pabr)
– Sale or issue locally by nonresidents (siln)
• Restrictions on financial credits (fc) are divided into two categories:
– By residents to nonresidents (fco)
– By nonresidents to residents (fci)
• Restrictions on direct investment (di) are divided into three categories:
– Outward investment (dio)
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– Inward direct investment (dii)
– Liquidation of direct investment (ldi)
The information contained in the AREAER is coded in binary form, taking a
value of 0 (unrestricted) or 1 (restricted). The data can be aggregated in different
ways, allowing the construction of capital control sub-indices by asset category,
by residency, and by the direction of flows. Sub-indices are aggregated by taking
unweighted averages of the subcategories of interest. Indices for outflow controls are
constructed for each individual asset category. For example:
inflow controls on asset category i (kaii) =
iplbn + isiar
2
where i stands for equities, money market instruments, bonds, or collective invest-
ment instruments. The aggregate inflow control (kai) is
kai =




Appendix D: Additional Tables and Figures
Table D.1: Data Source for Calibration
Data Source
Capital flows Internatinal Financial Statistics (IFS)
Net International Investment Position IFS




Trade Balance World Economic Outlook
Household Debt Financial Soundness Indicators
Government Debt World Development Indicators
Table D.2: Pairwise Correlation of Different Proxies of Capital Controls
Schindler Schindler CAPITAL CAPIN FINCONT2
Inflow General
Schindler Inflow 1.000
Schindler General 0.936 1.000
CAPITAL 0.734 0.802 1.000
CAPIN 0.728 0.782 0.934 1.000
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Note: Spread is the difference between Spain’s interest rate and Germany’s interest rate.
The left vertical axis provides scales for the real interest rate and the interest rate spread
(%). The right vertical axis provides scale for the NIIPs as percentage of GDP (%).
Figure D.2: Spain’s Debt by Household and Government as Percentage of GDP 
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Note: See Table D.1 for data source.
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